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Chapter 1 
Dilemmas of Development: 
An Introduction 
Benedict /. Tria Kerkvliet 
The four chapters that follow highlight some of the important 
political, social, economic, and legislative events in Vietnam 
during the late 1993 to late 1994 period. They began as papers 
presented to the Vietnam Update Conference, held 9-10 
November 1994 at the Australian National University, 
Canberra. They are being published quickly in order to make 
this book as current as possible to an audience interested in 
recent events in Vietnam. At the same time, the authors hope 
that their analyses will be relevant beyond the life span of the 
details, many of which inevitably will change rapidly. The 
chapters have themes that are likely to be prominent in 
Vietnam's development for several years to come. Hence 
reading them should shed light not only on what has just 
happened but what continues to happen. 
One theme concerns economic transformation. Most people 
who have followed developments in Vietnam are aware of the 
seismic shift that has occurred in the country's economy during 
the last dozen years. It has changed from one dominated by the 
state with highly restricted markets and based on collectivized 
production to one with a remarkably open and 'free' market. 
The state no longer seeks to control prices and production, 
collectivization has virtually disappeared, and entrepeneurship 
is flourishing. Economic growth has risen significantly; GDP 
increased nearly 9 per cent in 1994. Standards of living for 
most citizens have noticeably improved. Indeed, continued 
economic growth and expansion is a central concern of the 
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Communist Party's leadership. They believe, as Kerkvliet's 
chapter argues, that their continued dominance of the country's 
political system depends on a strong, vibrant economy. 
But that emphasis leads to dilemmas as new problems 
emerge and some old ones now become more visible. One 
dilemma concerns the environment. As Melanie Beresford 
indicates, the fast track to economic growth has had adverse 
environmental consequences. Not that environmental problems 
were absent when the economy was stagnant. But those 
previous ones have often been aggravated by the flurry of 
investment, commercial and industrial expansion, and other 
changes connected with the headlong drive for economic 
growth. Innovation, Beresford argues, is a necessary (though 
not sufficient) condition for addressing and reducing 
environmental damage. Unfortunately, despite the changed 
economic system, ingenuity on these matters remains extremely 
limited. Also vital in order for such problems to be remedied is 
a state that has the will and capacity to make and enforce 
environmentally friendly policies. Beresford finds evidence that 
Vietnam's state has these abilities, but also that it lacks them. 
Another dilemma involves labourers' working conditions. 
Stephanie Fahey points out that with the market economy has 
come a labour market. And in a country like Vietnam, bursting 
with underemployed people who are eager to work, it is a 
buyer's market. That often means employers provide rather 
miserable working conditions, pay extremely low wages, and 
are abusive to employees. Naturally, such circumstances make 
workers angry. At the same time cheap labour is one of the very 
attractions of Vietnam to foreign investors, which the state 
eagerly encourages. Yet Communist Party leaders and other 
state officials also say they want to help working class people 
and prevent exploitation. 
Additional problems associated with rapid economic 
development are discussed in Kerkvliet's chapter. A major one 
is corruption. Though not unknown prior to economic 
renovation, official abuse of public positions for personal gain 
has spread rapidly in recent years. Many high ranking 
Communist Party leaders warn that if the campaign to curb 
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corruption is unsuccessful, the credibility of the entire political 
system could conceivably be undermined. Another difficulty 
confronting authorities is the purpose of socialism, the 
country's official ideology. It seems to be increasingly 
amorphous and problematic as Vietnam's economy looks more 
and more like Taiwan's, South Korea's, and Singapore's. Yet 
party leaders continue to insist that Vietnam is and should be 
socialist. Some, though, dispute that; others agree but then 
seriously wonder what does 'socialism' really mean. 
Constituting a second theme in this book are the pressures 
on authorities in the Communist Party and other parts of the 
state to respond to and address serious problems. Some 
pressures come from within the state itself. Evidence in the 
chapters indicate considerable debate in officials circles about 
how to address environmental damage, improve labourers' 
conditions, fight corruption, and so forth. At the same time, 
people outside official circles, in society at large, voice their 
concerns, discontent, even anger. Fahey and Kerkvliet's 
chapters suggest that mounting labour unrest was one of the 
motivating forces behind the National Assembly's lengthy 
debates in 1994 over proposed labour laws. Another 
contributing influence were the concerns of employers and 
investors. Beresford suggests that grass roots protest against 
environmental degradation helps to explain why state agencies 
are taking environmental problems more seriously. Popular 
discontent with corrupt officials, Kerkvliet notes, has helped to 
make officials take notice of that problem. Pressure to loosen 
up the political system has also become more evident. Whether 
officials will be as responsive on this front as they seem to have 
been on others is still an open question. 
A third theme is the making and implementation of laws 
and rules as the state deals with changing circumstances. The 
first three chapters touch on new labour laws, environmental 
codes, administrative and judicial actions against corrupt 
officials, and legal charges against people regarded by officials 
as political dissidents. The fourth chapter, by John Gillespie, 
concentrates on law making and implementation processes in 
Vietnam. After highlighting changes in the legislative process 
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during recent years, Gillespie discusses aspects of recent laws 
concerning land and corporate regulations. For the latter, he 
traces the steps required to establish a corporation. Guiding his 
detailed discussion is a significant general phenomenon he 
finds in Vietnam's legal system - the interplay between 
statutory law and administrative regulation. Rather than seeing 
these as irreconcilable, as is the inclination among many foreign 
observers, Gillespie argues the two are complementary. 
This monograph is the first of two planned publications 
from the 1994 Vietnam Update conference. The second will 
look more specifically at state-society issues, pursuing 
questions concerning 'civil society' and the extent to which one 
can speak of autonomous groups and organizations bringing 
into public view questions, issues, problems that the state 
might not otherwise consider. 
Chapter 2 
Politics of Society in the 
Mid 1990s 
Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet* 
Introduction 
Much has been said by journalists, academic�, and 
development agencies about Vietnam's economic changes and 
remarkable achievements in recent
. 
years. Less analysis has 
been given to changes in society, their effect on politics in the 
country, and how political authorities are responding to, and 
trying to affect in tum, the growing dynamic interaction among 
economic changes, social changes and society-state relations. 
This is a large, complex, fascinating topic. In a sense, recent 
economic changes and the politics associated with them - the 
reduced control of state bureaucracy and Communist Party 
over the production and marketing of goods and services; a 
country more open now to trade and other intercourse with 
more parts of the world, new laws and procedures for the new 
circumstances - have contributed to the emergence of social 
* I am extremely grateful to Allison Ley and Claire Smith for 
helping me to gather material from FBIS, JPRS, BBC, SEASIA-L, and 
other services. Those materials have proved valuable for this study. I 
also am thankful to David Marr and Carl Thayer for regularly 
sharing materials with me and other Vietnam studies folks in the 
ANU's Coombs building. I have used several of those items, too, 
when preparing this chapter. I also thank Thaveeporn Vasavakul for 
correcting some factual errors and making helpful suggestions on an 
earlier draft. 
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forces, problems, and issues that cannot be easily ignored by 
state authorities. How these matters are manifested and how 
they are dealt with, inside and outside the institutions of the 
state, is what 'politics of society' refers to. Using events from 
late 1993 to late 1994, I want here to explore a few aspects of 
such politics and thereby demonstrate that a changing 
Vietnamese society poses significant political problems for 
leaders, especially those of the Communist Party, and for 
concerned citizens generally. Specifically, after some broad 
remarks about nature of state-society relations in Vietnam, I 
will discuss the political importance of economic growth, 
selected social problems (especially labour unrest), corruption, 
and pressures to alter the political system. 
Vietnam's political system 
I should first indicate the position I have tentatively come to 
about the political system in Vietnam, particularly the state and 
state-society relations. I say 'tentatively' because scholarly 
research has been so limited that we have little to go on when 
drawing conclusions about such matters. Yet inevitably, we 
academics find ourselves making generalizations in order to 
have a framework or orientation within which to makes sense 
of the material we have gathered. Such generalizations, of 
course, also influence what material is gathered, creating 
selective perception problems. Hence, there is all the more 
reason to be tentative about our generalizations. 
One cannot comfortably say that Vietnam's political system 
is 'open' or 'liberal'. Citizens cannot relatively easily express 
their views and concerns on a wide range of issues in an 
organized, public, and direct manner. Only one political party 
is allowed and the security apparatus of the state vigilantly 
guards against efforts to create other political organizations. 
The news media consists of, with few exceptions, organs of 
state institutions or those closely connected to it - e.g. 
newspapers are from the Communist Party, the army, the 
Fatherland Front (FF), People's Committees of provinces and 
cities, and so forth. The National Assembly convenes twice a 
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year, each time for about a month, but precious little 
information is made public about what is said and by whom 
when delegates debate proposed legislation. The building 
where the assembly meets is itself inaccessible to the average 
person. 
On the other hand, I find unhelpful the common 
characterizations in the academic and journalistic literature that 
Vietnam is a totalitarian system or mono-organizational or a 
bureaucratic polity. They portray policy making and 
implementation in Vietnam as being tightly controlled by and 
largely in the domain of the state's institutions - especially the 
Communist Party, bureaucracy, and military - and see those 
institutions as largely sealed off from and impervious to 
societal influences and interactions. Such frameworks also 
strongly suggest that Vietnam's society is forever under the 
thumb of the state. Seeing the country's political system in 
these ways leaves out too much that is important. 
The broad objectives of the top leadership of the 
Communist Party, military, and state ministries is to preserve 
national unity, defend and maintain Vietnam's national 
integrity and independence, preserve political peace and 
stability, and bring economic prosperity. These are themes 
repeatedly articulated in speeches and pronouncements by the 
prime minister, the party's general secretary, the president of 
the National Assembly, the armed forces heads, and others. 
These objectives are premised on and are to be achieved under 
the leadership of the Communist Party. That is, entwined with 
the broad national priorities is the continued dominance of the 
Communist Party over the country's political system. 
To maintain power, political leaders use a variety of 
methods. They employ repressive and threatening measures. 
They also use mass media and other methods to shape what 
people think, know, and do. But they use more than force and 
manipulation to remain in power. They also seek support. Most 
leaders want the political system they lead to have legitimacy 
in the eyes of significant sectors of the population, a concern 
that grows in part out of the mass-based revolutionary method 
by which the leaders' regime came to be in the first place and is 
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reinforced by the very propaganda and institutions created 
since. Speaking about China's Communist Party's leaders, X.L. 
Ding recently wrote that 'pressure of their own institutional 
environment' encourages them to care ' ... very much about the 
masses' understanding of, and support for, official 
socioeconomic objectives'. Communist leaders in China have 
been concerned about their legitimacy both in the eyes of 'high 
stratum' as well as lower stratum Ding says, investing 
'tremendous energy' in appealing to the large social groups in 
society (Ding 1994: 19) .  Much the same can be said about 
Vietnam's political elite. As a contrast, I think of the Marcos 
authoritarian regime in the Philippines, which came to power 
not by a mass movement but a coup d 'etat .  The political elite 
there cared little about whether their rule was legitimate in the 
eyes of workers, peasants, and other major sectors of society. 
To the extent they were concerned about legitimacy, they 
focused primarily on certain other elites in the country and key 
international audiences. Only when it was too late did the 
regime's leaders realize the importance of legitimacy among 
broad sectors of society. The Vietnamese elite have long 
realized this; whether they can maintain it is a question that 
concerns them. 
Terminology used by Brantly Womack for a somewhat 
different purpose remains helpful for conceptualizing 
Vietnam's political system. It is both 'mass regarding' and 
'authoritarian' (Womack 1987) . 1 The political elite seeks to rule 
not just by force, surveillance, fear, and, manipulation, though 
it does do that. Leaders also want mass support and legitimacy 
for themselves and the regime. While they use resources to 
control activities and influence, even restrict people's views, 
they also want to understand and be responsive to what people 
really experience and desire. And to do that, they try to 'hear' 
the masses' complaints, concerns, and needs. Political leaders 
generally are trying to avoid being cut off from 'the people'. At 
the same time, they are also often wary and distrustful of the 
1 Another term for 'mass regarding' that Womack uses is 'quasi­
democratic'. 
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people. Put another way, the political elite tries to distinguish 
between the 'genuine' masses and the 'enemies' within society 
who want to throw them out completely. Features of the 
political system impede the elite's efforts to 'hear' the masses 
and recognize who is an enemy and who is not. Key 
institutions do tend to be closed and unfriendly to average 
people. And too often leaders develop narrow vested interests, 
are self-serving, are corrupt, and become greedy. Yet other 
forces within the system are pushing to overcome these 
barriers. 
Economic growth 
Economic growth, while not proclaimed to be the answer to 
major problems in Vietnam, is heralded as the single most 
important and most comprehensive solution. From late 1993 to 
late 1994, major events involving the· government, Communist 
Party, and other institutions of the state included two party 
Central Committee sessions (first week of December 1993 and 
25-30 July 1994), two sessions of the National Assembly (6-30 
December 1993 and 25 May-23 June 1994), a special Mid Term 
Party Conference (20-25 January 1994), the fourth national 
congress of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (17-19 August 1994), 
and the 'Donor Conference' in December 1993 held in Paris at 
which the government requested ten billion US dollars in 
development assistance. The prominent theme emphasized in 
all is this: Vietnam's economic situation has improved 
tremendously in the last half dozen years thanks in large 
measure to the policies associated with doi moi (renovation), the 
party's leadership, and the hard work of the Vietnamese 
people, but Vietnam still has a long way to go in order to 'catch 
up' economically with the rest of Asia. 
To Vietnam's top leadership, economic growth and 
development concerns more than economics. It concerns their 
political future and that of the political system they head. Their 
thinking seems to be that significant economic improvement 
can earn popular support for the political system, particularly 
the Communist Party. Two of the three 'prominent 
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achievements' celebrated in the resolution emanating from the 
Mid Term Party National Conference in January 1994 are (1) 
the economy is significantly healthier, overcoming stagnation 
and crisis and consequently 'people's lives in many cities and 
rural areas have been improved', and (2) ' ... political stability 
has been maintained and consolidated'. This combination, the 
resolution says, means that the party's role 'has been 
strengthened'. The third achievement, the conference declared, 
has been the broadening of Vietnam's foreign relations, which 
among other benefits contributes to economic growth and 
therefore better domestic conditions (Communist Party 
1994:067:58) . The subsequent lifting of the United States' 
international trade embargo on February 3, considerable 
progress toward normalizing Vietnam-US relations during the 
rest of 1994, and other foreign policy achievements are 
expected to contribute to even more rapid and sustained 
economic benefits to the country. The critical connection for 
Vietnam's top leaders between economic prosperity and the 
continuation of the present political system is particularly clear 
in a speech by party Secretary General Do Muoi to cadres in 
March 1994: 
If our economy develops strongly, and living conditions, 
culture, the situation of our people gets better day by 
day, then I believe the people will defend the party, the 
system of government [chinh quyen], and regime [che do] 
such that hostile forces cannot do anything. The key 
point is to make a good economy, take care to make 
living conditions good. In the process, principally 
because of a good economy and living conditions, 
people's confidence [ tin tuong] in the party and regime 
will increase (Do Muoi 1994b:4) . 
More economic success, party leaders insist, is needed to 
assure political stability and legitimacy. The possibility of 
'being left further behind economically' is first among four 
'dangers' in the Mid Term Party Conference resolution and first 
among its eight key tasks (Communist Party 1994: [068] :58-59). 
Official documents and statements in late 1993 and during 1994 
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particularly emphasize the need for greater industrialization 
and the acquisition of modem technologies, better science, and 
more investment in research and development in order to 
continue the economic success of recent years.2 
This heavy political emphasis on economic improvement 
continues a strategy pursued since the late 1980s based on the 
theory that the transformation to a liberal economy must and 
can take place ahead of significant further changes in political 
institutions. The country's national leaders have consciously 
rejected arguments for simultaneous economic and political 
liberalization or, even worse from their point of view, 
arguments for putting political renovation ahead of an 
economic one (Stem 1993; Thayer 1991:31-32). Influencing the 
country's leaders' determination to follow this course are what 
has happened in several other countries in comparable 
situations. They see the negative cases of former Soviet Union 
and other Eastern European countries that put political 
transformation before economic liberation resulting in political 
chaos and economic disaster. Positive cases, on the other hand, 
like South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and China, put economic 
improvement way ahead of political liberalization, and the 
results have generally been favorable for society, political 
stability, and the incumbent regime.3 
Emphasizing economic liberalization to achieve high 
growth to, in turn, improve general living standards seems to 
be working. And one can probably say, though the information 
is more sketchy, that the credibility of the political system and 
the Communist Party in particular has generally gone up in the 
eyes of significant sectors of society. Yet with this success have 
emerged pressures on the political system, including to change 
it, with which the regime's leaders are struggling to cope. 
2 See, for instance, the resolution on industrialization from the 
Central Committee's seventh session of 7th Party Congress in July 
1994 (Central Committee 1994). 
3 There is a scholarly literature to support this line of thinking. See 
Zhang 1993. 
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Market socialism? 
In a sense, having 'got it right', economically speaking 
(assuming this is true - a claim environmentalists, for 
instance, would dispute), has created growing concern that the 
leadership has got it wrong politically speaking. One area 
where this shows is the tension between the leaders' new 
celebration of a market economy and their continued 
celebration of socialism. Political leaders in Taiwan, South 
Korea, and other newly industrialized countries (NICs) and 
near NICs have not had to wrestle with this problem. Having 
never claimed to be socialist political economies in the first 
place, they did not need to dump a socialist system in order to 
make room for free markets. Vietnam's leadership, however, 
has had to back away from socialist production and 
distribution and take on what in many respects is a capitalist 
system (though never officially called that). This situation, in 
turn, conveys to many Vietnamese that socialism has failed, 
creating tremendous difficulties for the regime's leaders to 
explain what socialism is and why it must be the official 
ideology. The nation is still required annually to celebrate the 
birthdays of Marx and Lenin; people are reminded daily that 
Vietnam is following a socialist path to development; and the 
country's name remains the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
Within the Communist Party and elsewhere in Vietnam 
people are questioning both the validity and wisdom of the 
political elite insisting on socialism. 'Validity' in that they 
wonder what is there any more that is socialistic about 
Vietnam. And 'wisdom' in that by insisting on socialism, the 
party's credibility is questionable, and the party conveys 
recalcitrance and conservatism, and the gap widens between 
the party and the general population for whom socialism has 
little or no meaning now, if it ever did. Socialism as an ideology 
should be abandoned, many argue. It helped the country to 
successfully fight for independence, but now it is a burden, 
weighing down society and the government in their efforts to 
accelerate economic growth and social and politic al 
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development. 4 Referring to party members who hold such 
views as 'opportunists', Pham Van Dong, the country's premier 
from the 1950s until he stepped down in 1986, summarizes 
some of these concerns prior to arguing against them . 
... there are people who want to follow the capitalist road 
and believe that socialism 'has become outdated' and 
'has collapsed'. There are other people who think that 
we should not use the world 'socialist' in the country's 
name, nor 'communist' in the party's name (Pham Van 
Dong 1993:21). 5 
Concerns and debates within the party about the meaning and 
purpose of socialism, among other issues, reportedly 
contributed to top leaders postponing a couple of times the 
party's mid term conference (FEER 2 December 1993). One of 
the four 'dangers' emphasized in the resolution from that 
conference was 'the risk of being disoriented from socialism . . .  '. 
The resolution urged party members to do their utmost ' . . .  to 
avoid this danger, not only at the level of grassroots 
management but also at the levels of policy making and 
orientation' (Communist Party 1994:[068]:56-57). 
One theme in arguments for keeping the socialist ideology 
is that what the country had in the past was not socialism after 
all. It was a system in which the state tried 'to control markets, 
production, people's lives, everything, and trying to maintain 
equality . .  . '. It 'didn't work and created considerable misery'. 6 
Closely related is the view that Marxist-Leninist ideas need to 
be reinvigorated by going back to what those thinkers said. A 
'principle mistake' in the past, says Pham Van Dong, 'was to 
separate Marxist-Leninist arguments from reality; ... as a result, 
4 Such views are expressed, for instance, by Ha Si Phu (1994), alias 
for a biologist working at the Science Institute of Vietnam. 
5 Pham Van Dong also noted that 'Still other people condemn the 
August Revolution and the two wars of resistance, which they say 
"were caused by the CPV".' 
6 Interview with a teacher in a school for Communist party leaders, 
Hanoi, September 1992. 
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we transformed the Marxist doctrine from being a guide for 
action into being dogmatic' (Pham Van Dong 1993:21) . 
Socialism and Marxist-Leninism, according to this argument, 
must be adapted and interpreted according to the times in 
order to develop and stay relevant to real conditions. 
Otherwise the socialist ideology will fade away, and the 
country will be taken over by capitalism. 
Another theme is that features in Vietnam's new economy 
may not look like socialism but nevertheless should be done in 
a way that help to build socialism. The 'capitalist factor being a 
means to build socialism and the capitalist factor being a means 
to build socialism are ... basically different', stressed Pham Van 
Dong, but if socialist direction lost, then indeed a capitalist 
rather than a socialist system will emerge (ibid. :21). Likewise, 
market economies in socialist and capitalist systems have many 
similarities, argues a writer in the party's daily newspaper 
Nhan Dan who is troubled by the drifting away from socialism 
that has accompanied doi moi. But one important difference is 
' ... whose interests state intervention in a market economy is 
supposed to serve ...  '. · The socialist one should serve the 
'labouring people' while the capitalists serve the 'exploiting 
minority'. Other differences include the basic concept in 
socialism that, even though the economy is 'multi sectoral', the 
state-run sector is a leading one (Nhan Dan 2 March 1994:3) . 
Such arguments sometimes go on to lament the decline and 
disappearance of cooperatives, state-owned enterprises, and 
other features associated with the pre-renovated Vietnamese 
economy, as if to suggest that socialism was somehow nearer at 
hand then. This does not impress most Vietnamese for whom 
that previous economic system is discredited. 
Social problems 
After applauding success of 'market mechanisms' and other 
features of new economic development, one concerned party 
member writes, 
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... these moves have also given rise to more social vices 
and new negative phenomena, especially social injustice, 
egoism, pragmatism, and the readiness to do anything 
for money.... These factors create a very new and 
complicated environment and constantly affect the 
thinking, sentiments, and psychology of cadres, party 
members, and the people. That situation has raised new 
problems concerning the party's leadership and the task 
of building, renovating, and revamping party 
organizations (Bui Dinh Bon 1994:67). 
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His worries are shared by many other Vietnamese within and 
outside official circles. 
The rise in narcotic trafficking, drug abuse, and prostitution 
has been alarming. Reportedly the country has over 800,000 
drug addicts and 600,000 prostitutes (Vietnam Insight, SEASIA­
L [Internet] 19 August 1993). They live not only in the· cities; 
provincial towns and villages,· too, have reported 
unprecedented increases in these problems. Hai Hung 
provincial authorities, for instance, in the Red River delta, said 
that there were only eleven known cases of drug abuse in 1990 
but in the first eight months of 1994 there were 85 (Voice of 
Vietnam [6 October 1994], BBC Monitoring Service: Asia­
Pacific, 12 October 1994). During National Assembly sessions in 
December 1993 and May-June 1994, many delegates expressed 
concern about the problem. Speaking to the December session, 
Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet urged that ways must be found to 
curb these social illnesses before they become even worse, 
'especially prostitution', he said, because it leads to AIDS.7 Kiet 
called for 'drastic measures' against owners and clients of 
brothels, emphasizing that if customers are civil servants, they 
should be dismissed from their jobs 'regardless of their 
position, and expelled from the party if they are party 
7 Officials report nearly 1,500 known HIV cases in 30 provinces and 
cities and 103 AIDS patients (Voice of Vietnam [7 June 1994], BBC 
Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 9 June 1994). The real level of 
infection estimated in 1993 was between 7,900 and 79,000 people (Viet 
Nam, HIV/AIDS 1994:4). 
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members' and their 'names will be announced to mass media' 
(Vo Van Kiet 1993:58).8 The Communist Party's Central 
Committee also issued directives in 1994 against prostitution 
and drug addiction (Vietnam Television [9 March 1994], BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 March 1994, FE/1943:B/3). 
Even more serious social problems that likely contribute to 
the drug addiction and prostitution are rising levels of 
unemployment, declining school enrolments, widening gaps 
between the poor and wealthy - all of which have frequently 
been discussed and debated in the National Assembly, Central 
Committee sessions, and countless conferences and meetings. 
Clearly, officials pin considerable hope on more economic 
growth to help alleviate these problems, which many recognize 
are partly the product of the very economic growth that the 
country has experienced in the last dozen years. 
While government and party leaders deliberate, people in 
various ways are acting to deal with these matters as best they 
can with or without authorities' help. People create new ways 
to make a living. A flood of villagers have streamed from the 
countryside into the cities to work as pedicab drivers, 
construction workers, porters, traders, street vendors, 
scavengers, and in other parts of what academics call the 
'informal economy'. Though technically such movement 
violates residency requirements and other laws, it occurs, with 
or without permission (Li Tana 1994). 
A different kind of activity are the growing number of 
groups and organizations trying to offer help to drug addicts, 
the homeless, the unemployed, street children, and others 
struggling in this new economic environment.9 Such groups 
also mount modest campaigns to draw more attention to social 
8 Such expulsions have occurred. The newspaper Tuoi Tre 
published the names of seven party officials holding key provincial 
and district posts in Kien Giang province who were caught having 
sex with prostitutes in a Vung Tau hotel room (Indochina Digest 16 
September 1994:2). 
9 This paragraph relies heavily on Carole Beaulieu's fascinating 
account (1994). 
Politics of Society in the Mid 1990s 17 
problems and solicit resources from government and 
international aid donors. Their causes range from poverty 
alleviation to environmental protection. Some are official 
organizations within the Fatherland Front that have become 
more energized in recent years. Other groups have been 
created by government agencies, an arrangement which 
constrains their work but gives them protection and access to 
resources they might not otherwise have, which some creative 
activists in these types of organizations have been able to use in 
ways not entirely consistent with their creators' agendas. Still 
another category includes groups independent of the 
Communist Party, the Fatherland Front, and the government. 
Often their leaders are retired officials whose connections with 
authorities perhaps provide some protection for their 
organizations. Many have funding from foreign development 
assistance sources, which in turn increases their independence. 
The number of such groups has grown noticeably in recent 
years. Meanwhile their legal status remains unclear, creating 
dilemmas for authorities. Trying to stop them would perhaps 
create considerable controversy for the regime; but to let them 
work independently flaunts the party's insistence that all 
organizations should be under the Fatherland Front. 
Perhaps in time some legal standing will be given to these 
non-government organization just as authorities decided in 
1994 to recognize the legality of another kind of autonomous 
organized activity: workers' strikes. From 1989 to late 1993, 
according to one official source, workers went on strike in 27 
state-owned enterprises and seventeen private companies 
(Nguyen Van Tu 1994:28). Another report, based on Ministry of 
Labour figures, says there were 70 strikes in 1992 and 1993 
alone (Vietnam Investment Review 22-28 November 1993:14). At 
least ten strikes occurred during the first three months of 1994 
(Reuter News Service 9 April 1994). Most of the strikes were in 
the southern part of Vietnam, though some did occur in central 
and northern areas. All of these strikes occurred outside the 
law and often at odds with the instructions of the official 
General Confederation of Vietnamese Labour (VGCL, Cong 
Doan), which is supposed to represent all labourers. 
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Workers resorted to drastic measures apparently not only 
because many foreign and Vietnamese companies were paying 
extraordinarily low wages (often below the legal minimum) but 
also because they were being forced to work overtime without 
compensation, beaten, and abused in other ways. Besides better 
pay and fairer treatment, workers in many strikes demanded 
'greater "democracy" in the workplace'.1° 
While workers have struggled to deal with these problems 
and pressures by the VGCL against drastic action, many have 
become critical of the VGCL itself, arguing that it was more 
interested in defending the employers than them. Within the 
VGCL, according to Gerard Greenfield, cadre themselves have 
been divided. Many at the local level side with the workers' 
against the organization's higher officials, reinforcing the 
labourers' complaints against the VGCL. They endorse the 
criticism that for too long the VGCL has been a top-down 
organization, conveying to workers what the Communist 
Party's leadership wants rather than pressing for workers' 
needs (Greenfield 1994:221-23). These and other matters were 
voiced in numerous local meetings leading up to the seventh 
national congress of the VGCL. That congress was supposed to 
meet in October 1993 but was postponed until November 10-12 
because of vociferous debate within the VGCL. 'What began as 
the usual pre-congress "mass mobilization" campaign ... turned 
into open conflict between trade union members and their 
representatives in which public criticism of the failures of the 
trade union movement was unleased' (ibid. :220) . Tensions 
within the confederation persisted during and after its 
November congress. One positive outcome was the VGCL's 
endorsement of legislation then being considered by the 
National Assembly to legalize strikes, at least under certain 
conditions (Reuter News Service 2 November 1993). And the 
VGCL's president (and also party Central Committee member), 
10 Vietnam Investment Review 22-28 November 1993:14; Agence 
France Presse 21 February 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-036, 23 February 
1994:42; and Greenfield 1994:226-27. For additional information, see 
Stephanie Fahey's chapter in this volume. 
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Nguyen Van Tu, has signalled that its unions 'must undergo a 
major renovation' so that they can defend workers' interests 
(Nguyen Van Tu 1993:28). 
During its May 1994 session, the National Assembly 
acknowledged the growing pressure from workers, private 
business people, and state enterprises by passing a labour law. 
Debate over numerous provisions, especially concerning 
strikes, was heated, though like all National Assembly sessions, 
few details of what was said have been made public. There are 
hints that one fissure was that some delegates wanted a more 
liberal and pro-worker orientation to the law than what 
ultimately passed. The new code does legalize strikes, though 
conditions and restrictions are imposed regarding the process 
by which strike decisions are taken and the conditions under 
which strikes will be legitimate.11 It prohibits strikes in 
enterprises considered essential to the economy or national 
security and defence. A provision that would seem to recognize 
the importance of localized rather than centralized decision 
making within the labour movement is that executive 
committees of the trade union at the grass roots levels has the 
authority to decide by majority vote whether to strike or not. 
Among the law's numerous other provisions is that collective 
bargaining in the work place is required, potentially giving 
worker organizations more protection than before.12 
Passing such a law is one thing. Interpreting and enforcing 
it on the ground will, as always, be another matter. No doubt 
considerable controversies and disputes lie ahead, and 
innovations by workers and owners will swing wide of 
structures which authorities think they have put in place. Many 
issues within the trade union movement also remain 
. unresolved, perhaps the most crucial being the extent to which 
workers may organize outside the Communist Party's VGCL -
11 For a negative assessment of the law as far as advancing workers' 
interests are concerned, see Greenfield 1994:227-28. 
12 Vietnam News Agency (18 June 1994), BBC Monitoring Service: 
Asia-Pacific, 21 June 1994; Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade 1994. 
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a debate that contributes to growing political pressures on the 
party, as discussed later in this chapter. 
Corruption 
One of the most volatile issues facing Vietnam's leaders is 
corruption, meaning the taking advantage of one's public 
position and authority to appropriate 'the property of the 
people' and to enrich oneself through such activities as 
smuggling, accepting or demanding bribes, embezzlement and 
other forms of stealing, graft, and kickbacks.13 Already 
corruption has aroused citizens in numerous villages and 
towns to march, protest, and sometimes even brandish guns 
because they are so angry at corrupt local officials. Such 
demonstrations of discontent in late 1988 by peasants in the 
south were early warnings to officials about the political 
significance of the problem (Thayer 1992a:354). Many more 
have occurred since. In early 1994, for instance, numerous 
villagers in an unspecified part of the country were so upset at 
local officials whom they strongly suspected of siphoning off 
for themselves money allocated for infrastructure development 
that they surrounded and refused to release for two days the 
village chairperson (Nang Dan Viet Nam 21January 1994:7). An 
analysis of 120 incidents of 'major or even fierce struggles' 
among people in Thanh Hoa province found that a principal 
cause is that 'some of the leading and managerial cadres at the 
primary [local] level are corrupt and have violated the 
ownership rights of the people' (Nhi Le 1994:71). A report on 
'voters opinions' to the National Assembly's December 1993 
session said that corruption, smuggling, and inadequate 
prosecution against perpetrators were among citizens' greatest 
concerns (Vu Mao 1993:72). 
l3 This is basically how Nguyen Van Linh, former Communist party 
secretary general ( 1986-91 )  and now adviser to the Central 
Committee, talks about the meaning of corruption (Reuter News 
Service 10 May 1993) . 
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Many political leaders worry that corruption could fatally 
poison the Communist Party as a credible political institution 
and undermine their efforts to shore up the legitimacy of the 
political system. No doubt many are aware that hostility 
against corruption contributed significantly to public 
·upheavals that toppled the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
European socialist regimes and challenged the Chinese regime 
at Tiananmen Square in 1989.14 As the National Assembly's 
December 1993 resolution on the subject states, 'corruption, 
smuggling and waste ... have developed to a serious degree, 
thereby corrupting a segment of cadres and state personnel, 
adversely affecting social order and safety, creating indignation 
among the public and diminishing the people's confidence in 
our regime' (National Assembly 1993:B/5}. 
Corruption and smuggling (which often involves 
connivance with officials, if not actually being done by them) 
were prominent issues at several additional official gatherings 
between late 1993 and mid 1994. In October 1993, the 
Communist Party held a 'special "in-family" meeting to discuss 
corruption within its ranks' (Agence France Presse 27 October 
1993, SEASIA-L (Internet). Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and 
National Assembly Chair Nong Due Manh convened a May 
1994 meeting to discuss how to implement the National 
Assembly's resolution to increase the fight against corruption 
and smuggling. Among those attending were the chief judge of 
the Supreme People's Court, leading cadres of various 
ministries and departments, and several National Assembly 
leaders (Voice of Vietnam, FBIS-EAS-94-094, 16 May 1994). 
Abuse of office for private gain was also condemned during the 
Central Committee's November 1993 and July 1994 sessions. 
And delegates to the January 1994 Mid Term Party Conference 
in Hanoi reportedly concluded that 'corruption is not only 
practised by a few people, but it resembles an organization 
14 In a succinct analysis of what led up to the 1989 upheavals in 
Eastern Europe, Daniel Chirot argues that a major factor was people's 
disgust with the ' . . .  utter moral rot' in the political systems there 
(1991:20). 
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which operates from a system existing in state organs' (Voice of 
Vietnam, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts FE/1903, 24 January 
1994: B/5). The resolution issued at the end of the conference 
cited corruption as one of the four greatest dangers now facing 
the party and that it 'has become a national disaster ... that is 
wearing down our people's confidence' (Communist Party 
1994:[068], 57). 
Available data are too sketchy to assess well the extent of 
corruption and how effective the government's campaign 
against it has been. Nearly 3,000 cases of corruption (not 
including smuggling) were reported in 1992; 918 in the first ten 
months of 1993, and 919 in the first eight months of 1994. 
Smuggling figures, reported separate from other corruption 
(apparently because non-officials can engage in it), are 50,000 
reported cases in 1992, 17,025 in the first eight months of 1993 
(perhaps reflecting a reported reduction of smuggling 
involving officials), and 12,430 during the first six months of 
1994.15 If such numbers are comparable, they suggest a sharp 
drop between 1992 and 1994, though some rise between 1993 
and 1994. On the other hand, perhaps how 'corruption' and 
'smuggling' were tallied in 1992 is different from how they 
have been counted since, hence the contrasts are not 
meaningful. Or maybe law enforcement was actually better 
before, detecting more cases in 1992 than in the last two years, 
despite the government's stepped-up efforts against corruption 
and smuggling. The amounts of money and other valuables 
involved appear to have increased significantly, from the 
equivalent of about US$230 per smuggling case detected in 
1992, to $1,731 in 1993, to $2,299 in the first half of 1994 (staying 
well ahead of inflation). For corruption, the amounts per case 
were $2,920 in 1997, $29 ,570 in 1993 - a whopping ten fold 
l5 Statistics noted here come from Heng 1993:356; Nhan Dan (23 
December 1993), FBIS-EAS-94-012, 19 January 1994:41;  Voice of 
Vietnam (8 December 1993), FBIS-EAS-93-238, 14 December 1993:70-
71; Voice of Vietnam (16 July 1994), FBIS-EAS-94-139, 20 July 1994:72; 
Reuter News Service, 22 October 1994. 
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increase - and $44,460 in 1994.16 These figures suggest that 
more 'big fish' are being caught than before, which would 
mean recent anti-corruption efforts are paying off. Perhaps the 
best indicator of the overall situation are the conclusions in the 
minister of Interior's December 1993 report to the National 
Assembly that even though the campaign had been 
accelerating, it has 'generated few results', ' ... [s]ignificant 
changes have not been attained, and corruption and smuggling 
are still prevalent' (Voice of Vietnam, FBIS-EAS-93-238, 14 
December 1993:70-71). 
Three prominent corruption cases in 1994 involved a textile 
manufacturer, a beer maker, and a government minister. In 
April, Nguyen Thi Son was dismissed from her position as 
general director of Legamex, a state-owned garment factory. 
And in June she was arrested and scheduled to be tried. She 
was charged with using company money to help friends' 
businesses and favouring her relatives with shares in the 
company.17 The brewer is Hoang Chi Quy, director of Saigon 
Brewery, who in February was kicked out of the Communist 
Party for abusing his position to acquire five houses and profit 
from an earlier beer shortage (FEER 17 March 1994:55). Also in 
February, former Energy Minister Vu Ngoc Hai was tried and 
convicted for masterminding a scam involving 4,000 tonnes of 
steel for the country's north-south power line causing loses to 
the state equal to nearly US$300,000 - charges he persistently 
denied. Eight accomplices were also convicted, among them 
former Deputy Minister for Energy Le Nien, and the heads of 
three state companies. Fired from his ministerial post in 1992 
by Prime Minister Kiet and expelled from the party's Central 
Committee by the Mid Term Party Conference in January 1994, 
Hai is the highest ranking party member of government official 
yet to be tried and convicted of corruption (Reuter News 
Service 17-23 February 1994). 
16 I am using 10,500 dong to the US dollar to convert monetary 
amounts reported in the sources cited in the previous footnote. 
17 Reuter News Service 13 June 1994; The Australian 9 June 1994:31. 
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One of the worst features of corruption is that the very 
people who are supposed to be fighting it are themselves 
among the perpetrators, a point the Minister of Interior Bui 
Thien Ngo highlighted (Nhan Dan 23 December 1993:1). For 
instance, the chief and deputy chief of the customs smuggling 
control team for Quang Nam-Da Nang province were caught 
smuggling vehicles (Reuter News Service 26 October 1993). A 
captain in charge of Nam Ha province's 'economic police', 
whose duty is to catch corrupt officials, was convicted (and 
sentenced to death) for misappropriating gold and cash worth 
over US$300,000 (Reuter News Service 22 August 1994). Too 
often police and public security (Cong An) officers demand 
bribes and engage in graft. An example is a lieutenant colonel 
in Hanoi's public security who was found guilty of making 
money selling car registration documents to smugglers (Nong 
Dan Viet Nam 10 June 1994:1ff). In the army, about 100 
corruption and smuggling cases were adjudicated in 1993 and 
several more in 1994, over half involving Communist Party 
members.18 
Corruption is certainly not peculiar to Vietnam; it is a 
serious problem for numerous other Asian countries, including 
some of the NICs and near-NICs (e.g. Japan, South Korea, 
Indonesia, and Thailand). Nor is it a new phenomenon to 
Vietnam. It was widespread in the government of the Republic 
of Vietnam in the south, contributing to that government's 
chronic lack of popular support. But at least until the recent 
past, the Communist Party-led government of Vietnam has 
prided itself in being relatively clean and party leaders from 
local levels to Uncle Ho Chi Minh leading rather austere lives. 
And they were generally seen that way by most people. This is 
not to say corruption did not exist; it did and sometimes caused 
people to be bitter against their local officials. But by and large 
the misuse of public property and positions of authority were 
modest and involved few cadre. 
l8 Agence France Presse, FBIS-EAS-94-016, 25 January 1994:72; Voice 
of Vietnam, FBIS-EAS-94-071, 13 April 1994:52-53. 
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Why the relatively recent and rapid increase in corruption 
is not clear. In-depth analysis has not been done, so far as I am 
aware, by Vietnamese or foreigners. Broadly speaking, two 
interrelated reasons may help to explain this change. One is the 
new economic environment itself. The opportunities for people 
in authority positions to take bribes and kickbacks are much 
more numerous than before. One of the most common types of 
corruption, for instance, is officials colluding with foreign 
business partners to cheat the state of taxes, material, and cash 
(Nha n Dan 23 December 1993:2). Added to the new 
opportunities is the new ethos, closely associated with market 
economies, that encourages material consumption and endless 
desires for anything money can buy. A spokesperson for the 
people's committee in Ho Chi Minh City put the problem this 
way: 'When you move to a market economy people stop 
thinking about communist ideology and they think only about 
profit...' (quoted in Economist, SEASIA-L [Internet] 4 June 1994). 
The decline in public services like health care and education 
that has accompanied the new market economy also 
contributes to people having greater concern for making and 
accumulating money in order to improve their children's 
educational opportunities, pay for medical expenses, etc. All 
this is happening in the context of low salaries for public 
servants, adding to the problem. 
A second reason is moral decay among too many 
Communist Party members and other authorities. Ultimately, 
corruption is an ethical problem. A public official has to answer 
the question, should I take advantage of my position for 
personal gain or not? Those who answer 'yes' on the grounds 
that their families are genuinely destitute can plausibly be 
given understanding by fellow Vietnamese, perhaps even 
forgiven. The most politically disturbing corruption, however, 
is not the petty corruption of lowly-paid local policemen and 
office clerks. It is the debauchery by officials who have 
relatively well-paid positions and perks such as cars, expense 
accounts, and housing. Their justifications are ethically 
bankrupt. 
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The political leadership's fight against corruption includes 
an emphasis on better training and education of party members 
and other officials, teaching them the importance of discipline 
and honesty. This orientation, if it works, will obviously 
require considerable time before results take hold. Meanwhile, 
the anti-corruption campaign also stresses tighter 
administrative procedures, increased policing and prosecution, 
stiffer penalties, and making all heads of administrative 
agencies at all levels individually responsible for corruption 
occurring at each level.19 
Critics inside and outside elite circles argue such measures 
are poorly enforced and insufficient. An editorial in the party 
newspaper complained that officials ' ... have slackened 
inspection and failed to take timely action [against 
corruption] ... and [s]ome local party committee echelons, 
including a significant number ... at central-level agencies, do 
not make due efforts to direct the anti-corruption campaign. 
Many local anti-corruption and smuggling mechanisms 
perform poorly' (Nhan Dan 1 July 1994:1). Letters to the editor 
in newspapers and magazines frequently complain of corrupt 
officials and the lack of determination by authorities to 
investigate and prosecute. As one letter said, ' ... despite the 
government's numerous directives, decisions, policies, and 
other legal measures, corruption and smuggling becomes 
worse by the day, more sophisticated, and more shameless. 
Corrupt rascals still slip through the net ... ' (Nhan Dan 1 
February 1994:3). A theme in debates during the Mid Term 
Party Conference in January 1994 was the pressing need for 
"more energetic" action against corruption' (Voice of Vietnam, 
FBIS-EAS-94-015, 24 January 1994:74). 
Some have argued that the party's success in fighting 
corruption is meagre because too many officials have vested 
material interests in the status quo. The new capitalist class 
emerging in Vietnam is, as one party member wrote, 'formed 
19 See excerpt from Vo Van Kiet's address to the National Assembly 
(Voice of Vietnam, FBIS-EAS-93-247, 28 December 1993:57-59); Bui 
Thien Ngo 1993:71; National Assembly 1993. 
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mainly around smuggling and corruption'. And this class 
'consists of powerful officials in the structure of the party and 
government at all ranks and all branches . . .  '. Based on this and 
other stinging assessments, the critic, who is a geologist in a 
state environmental agency, goes on to call for 'political 
freedom and democracy' (Nguyen Thanh Giang 1993).20 
Such arguments are lambasted by numerous party officials, 
among them Senior Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang 
(1994), for taking advantage of corruption and other mistakes 
to call for far-reaching political change - which, if listened to, 
would bring instability and chaos, setting Vietnam back 
decades and threatening the gains of the country's revolution 
and long struggle for independence and unity. General 
Secretary Do Muoi (1994b:5), too, warns against enemies who 
grab on to corruption in order to undermine the political 
system. 
Studies of successful efforts to drastically reduce corruption 
in other Asian countries without a radical change in 
government find that while appealing to people's ethical and 
moral senses, raising public servants' salaries and giving other 
positive incentives to officials not to be corrupt, training 
officials to be more professional, and improving auditing and 
other administrative procedures are important, they are not 
enough. Three additional measures are required. One is a 
system for gathering reliable and extensive information in 
order that the chances are high that anyone who engages in 
corruption will be caught. Second, penalties for corrupt 
behaviour need to be strictly and uniformly enforced, and they 
should be clearly commensurate with the kinds of corruption 
- the more serious the corruption, the stiffer the penalty. The 
third element is a strong, well-financed investigative and 
enforcement agency that is above reproach in honesty and the 
use of its powers. It should have the authority to find and 
prosecute corrupt officials wherever they may be, from the 
highest to lowest levels (Klitgaard 1988:74-97, 115-31). Thus far, 
there is little evidence of these three in Vietnam. Watching for 
20 Also see Greenfield 1994, especially pp. 215-16. 
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them to emerge would be a guide for assessing how seriously 
the political elite takes the growing indignation in society 
against corruption. 
Criticisms of the present political system 
High-ranking political leaders in Vietnam routinely assert that 
not only is Vietnam a socialist country but it is a democratic 
one. They do not mean 'democratic' in the sense of 'liberal 
democracy' as found in the United States and Australia. Such 
political systems, Vietnamese leaders argue, are not only 
different from Vietnam's but undesirable because they are often 
violent and verge on anarchy and in reality are run by 
dominant capitalist interests . Vietnam's democracy, its leaders 
often underline, is 'rule of the people, for the people, and by the 
people' .  And 'the people ' refers especially to workers and 
peasants, though increasingly in recent years also to 
intellectuals. Also celebrated in recent years is that Vietnam is 
building a 'law governed state' in which rules and regulations 
are to be clear and uniform, with minimal amount of 
ambiguity, partiality, and manipulation by connections and 
personalistic rule-making and implementation. Developing a 
body of law in keeping with new economic environment has, 
indeed, been a major project of the state and notable progress 
has been made (Thayer and Marr 1993; Porter 1990). 
Yet the significant gap between what is claimed and what is 
actually happening, particularly with regard to democracy and 
the Communist Party's role as the leader and voice of the 
people, remains a grave shortcoming that has been condemned 
at many levels. Corruption, discussed earlier, is one large blight 
on the standards the political leadership has set for itself. 
Another is 'authoritarianism', cited by the resolution issued by 
the January 1994 Mid Term Party Conference as one of the 
foremost dangers confronting the Communist Party. In an 
article published a few weeks later, Political Bureau member 
Vu Oanh elaborated with a list of failings: 
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The party does not yet deeply understand the people; 
the people in reality are not closely attached to the party; 
lower level cadres dare not tell the truth to higher level 
ones. The atmosphere for democracy, debate, and 
dialogue in order to find the truth is limited . . . .  [T]he 
illnesses of bureaucratic concentration and arbitrary and 
autocratic rule [benh tap trung quan lieu, doc doan chuyen 
quyen] still exists . . .  (Vu Oanh 1994 [ 1 February] : 3) .  
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Another party member wrote 'bossism, arbitrariness, ignoring 
public opinion, neglecting state law, . . .  [and] authoritarianism' 
within the party must also be stopped. Required, he said, is the 
promotion of 'true democracy' (Bui Dinh Bon 1994:68). There is 
too much 'formalistic democracy' within and outside the 
Communist Party, says Vu Oanh; the party needs 'to organize 
democratic debates among the people' and party leaders must 
'talk to the people, listen to their views, and discuss the 
situation with them . . .  ' (Vu Oanh 1993 [24 December] :3) .  In 
order to move 'the bureaucratic state to the democratic one, 
from stagnancy to dynamic action . . .  ', Pham Van Dong 
emphasized, continued renovation of party is required, because 
' .. .in reality, we must admit that the party's political vanguard 
role has shown that it has fallen short. . .. The capabilities and 
qualities of party members still show a gap in regard to the 
needs of the situation' (Pham Van Dong 1993:22) . 
Clearly, party leaders are aware of many shortfalls. And 
they feel pressure from within and outside circles of power to 
confront the situation. The party's seventh congress in 1991,  
several sessions of the Central Committee since (including the 
sixth in November 1993 and the seventh in July 1994), and the 
Mid Term Party Conference in January 1994 have endorsed 
gradual political reforms and emphasized the need to 
rejuvenate the Communist Party's relationship with the general 
public (Thayer 1992b; Communist Party 1994 [070]:76; [075] :59-
61) .  But finding a balance between accommodation, on the one 
hand, and preservation of the status quo (including the one­
party system), on the other, is difficult and perilous. 
National Assembly delegates devoted considerable time in 
June 1994 to debating proposed legislation, which after several 
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amendments were passed, to reform the people's councils, 
including how council members are elected and the 
relationship of the councils to people's committees. Each 
province, provincial city, district, and commune is supposed to 
have a people's council, which the Constitution says is 'the 
local organ of State power', the counterpart to the National 
Assembly at each level (Constitution 1992:59) . Apparently, 
judging from the sparse information available about the 
assembly's debates, part of the objective was to make the 
councils more active, representative, and powerful, moving 
them from the sidelines of local governance where they have 
been overshadowed by the people's committees to the centre -
a direction that would be parallel to the National Assembly's 
own increased importance in recent years. 21 Part of the impetus 
for this may be, for instance, villagers demanding self­
government even at the hamlet level and more representation 
at higher levels of government (Tran Lan Huong 1994) . 
Strengthening the people's councils is also cited by official 
documents as an aspect of the making government generally 
more accountable and separating legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers (Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1993:39-40) . 
An important theme in the fourth national congress of 
Fatherland Front in August 1994 was to make it relevant to the 
new, more vibrant character of Vietnamese society. Speaking to 
the nearly 460 delegates attending the first congress in six 
years, Secretary General Do Muoi said that because of recent 
'changes in the structure of everyday life, the economic sectors, 
and the social classes', organizations within the FF need to 
'broaden and diversity efforts . . .  to attract more people . . .  ' (Do 
Muoi 1994a) . Implicit in his remarks was criticisms made more 
forth rightly and directly by others about the Peasant 
Association, Confederation of Vietnamese Workers, and other 
organizations within the FF that these groups were lethargic, 
top-down, and inattentive to needs of people they were 
21 Various Voice of Vietnam accounts (1-3 and 17 June 1994), from 
BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, and FBIS-EAS-94-106, 107, 120, 
of 2, 3, and 23 June 1994. 
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supposed to represent.22 Earlier in the year Le Quang Dao, a FF 
leader who was elected its head at the August congress, 
complained that the front had to overcome the perception that 
it was ' . . .  only a symbolic, formal organization, an "ornamental 
plant'" . A major task of FF organizations, he said, is 'to attract 
more typical people from among the various classes, social 
strata, nationalities, religions, etc., in particular those who are 
not party members' (Le Quang Dao 1994:67-68). A statement 
issued after the front's congress underscored this orientation, 
adding that the FF wanted to unite all Vietnamese 
' . .  . irrespective of their past and ideology' (Vietnam News 
Agency, BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 19 August 1994). 
Organizations within FF, Le Quang Dao says, should be based 
on 'democratic consultation' with the purpose to 'rally the 
people and, on behalf of the people's groups and other member 
organizations, put forward necessary issues to the party and 
state for consideration . . .  ' (ibid. :67) . 
Contrary, however, to this theme of needing to be more 
inclusive and open in order to make Vietnam's political system 
more responsive to people's needs and concerns is a different 
theme of control and domination by the Communist Party 
coupled with dark suspicion and hostility toward those who 
challenge or are perceived to challenge the central place of the 
party. 
Though the new FF president says that the front 'operates 
in accordance with the principles of democratic consultation, 
equal cooperation, mutual respect . . .  ', he reminds his audiences 
that ' [w]e must hold fast to the principle that the party 
exercises leadership' .  The party is 'both a member and the 
leader' of the FF (ibid. :66-67) . The FF is also supposed to be the 
. supra-organization for all other organizations. Leaders worry 
that organizations outside the FF pose potential threats . 
Referring to the many 'different classes and social strata' 
emerging in Vietnam, Le Quang Dao cites in particular a 
22 See the critique of the Peasant Association (Hoi Nong Dan) in Dai 
Doan Ket 21 May 1993:1££. This weekly magazine is a publication of 
the Fatherland Front. 
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rapidly expanding 'contingent of private businessmen' . 'If we 
[in the FF] know how to unite and lead it well, this social 
stratum will play a positive role in national construction . 
Otherwise, it will develop perniciously and negatively' 
( ibid . :64) . Similar concern for control surfaces in recent 
discussions about elections for the people's councils . National 
Assembly Vice Chair Phung Van Tuu explained that if there are 
conflicting views between the consultative conference 
empowered to select candidates and the local party leader, the 
party leader, after taking into consideration the consultative 
conference, would have final say (Voice of Vietnam, BBC 
Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 21 September 1994) . Vu Oanh, 
though critical of the party's failure to be more in touch with 
Vietnamese society, also emphasizes the need for 
'strengthening the party leadership' over 'the Fatherland Front, 
mass organization, and public movements . . .  ', underscoring 
that the party 'directs the National Assembly elections . . .  ' and 
'directs the front and mass organizations by helping them 
formulate their orientations, guidelines, objectives and tasks' 
(Vu Oanh 23  December 1993:3) . The party's Mid Term 
Conference, after stressing that Vietnam is building a law 
governed state in which there are three branches of power -
legislature, executive, and administration - felt compelled to 
say that it is the party that 'formulates lines and policies and 
leads political organizations to implement them' (Communist 
Party 1994:070, 75) . 
Groups and individuals who openly oppose the central role 
of the Communist Party or the maxim of single-party 
governance are likely to get into trouble with state authorities. 
A dramatic example is the Unified Buddhist Church of 
Vietnam (UBCV), which persistently challenges the Communist 
Party's claim to dominate all organizations within the country 
and refuses to join the FF. These Buddhists are not necessarily 
against communism per se. They seem to oppose any political 
system that tries to dominate and control them. In the context 
of a more liberal economy and more open society, the UBCV 
has acted more directly to assert its views. The most explosive 
confrontation thus far occurred in May 1993 when several 
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UBCV monks, followers, and other citizens blocked traffic and 
jostled with police. In Detember 1993 its top leader, Venerable 
Thich Huyen Quang, publicly called for the government to 
undertake political reforms, including abandoning the one­
party system (Asia Watch 1994) . In mid July 1994 a Buddhist 
monk in Vinh Long province burned himself to death, 
reportedly to protest against the Vietnamese government's 
persecution of the UBCV and other infringements of religious 
freedoms . 23 In mid August, police arrested more than 100 
Buddhists as they staged a hunger strike in downtown Ho Chi 
Minh City while demanding 'their right to preach and study 
their faith without government interference . . .  ' (Associated 
Press, SEASIA-L [Internet], 18 August 1994) . 
Because the UBCV has a sizeable membership with good 
connections to Buddhist and other religious groups 
internationally and because Buddhists in Vietnam can be 
politically explosive (as the Ngo Dinh Diem government failed 
to appreciate in the early 1960s), officials have thus far 
refrained from using the full weight of their military and police 
forces. Numerous monks and lay people have been arrested 
and imprisoned, usually, it seems, on charges other than 
political ones. The four monks and five lay Buddhists arrested 
following the Hue confrontation were convicted in November 
1993 for 'disturbing public order' and given prison sentences 
ranging from six months to four years (Voice of Vietnam [15 
November 1993] SEASIA-L [Internet], 22 November 1993) . 
Government officials have managed to keep the confrontation 
from escalating further also by using the national radio and 
television media to put their case in the best light and portray 
the protesting Buddhists in a negative manner and, quite likely, 
by continuing behind-the-scenes discussions with Buddhists 
involved, perhaps through intermediaries. But pressures from 
Buddhist and other religious groups is unlikely to dissipate 
23 Reuter News Service, 18 July 1994, SEASIA-L (Internet), 20 July 
1994; Agence France Presse, FBIS-EAS-94-137, 18 July 1994:70; Agence 
France Presse, FBIS-EAS-94-139, 20 July 1994:69. 
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without concessions and could escalate if authorities use more 
violence. 24 
Other direct challenges to the Communist Party 's  
domination of the government have also been reported in 
recent months. A small group in Ho Chi Minh City advocating 
'pluralism' and 'true democracy with an inherent civil liberties 
and freedoms' had planned a conference in that city in 
November 1993, perhaps with an aim to influencing the Mid 
Term Party Conference. Organizers thought that they had 
support from high level Communist Party officials for this 
meeting to which retired general William Westmoreland and 
former CIA director William Colby had been invited from the 
United States. Stephen Young, an American in Vietnam who 
was involved in the planning, said that support had come from 
'liberals in the party' favouring a gradualist course toward a 
more open political system. If there were such backers, they 
could not prevail. Police arrested three Vietnamese who 
allegedly were organizing the meeting and deported Young 
(FEER 9 December 1993: 12-13). Also prior to the January party 
conference, photocopied critiques of the party's insistence on 
socialism and its resistance to political liberalization circulated 
around the country. One author was Ha Si Phu (Nguyen Xuan 
Tu), a respected biologist at the Science Institute of Vietnam in 
Hanoi . Another was Lu Phuong, former official in the 
government's Ministry of Culture and former party member, 
who is now a photographer in Ho Chi Minh City (FE ER 2 
December 1993:26) . Lu Phuong and Ha Si Phu were not 
arrested, as far as is known, though they are reportedly under 
surveillance and their movements have been restricted. For 
instance, Lu Phuong was not permitted to travel to Australia to 
24 Catholic Church groups have had run-ins with the state, too. The 
most notable recent instance concerns the assignment of Bishop 
Nguyen Van Thuan, nephew of Ngo Dinh Diem, to Ho Chi Minh 
City. Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet objected strenuosly. After 
considerable negotiation, the Vatican decided to assign the bishop to 
Rome instead (Agence France Presse, 2 and 17 March 1994, FBIS-EAS-
94-041 :42 and 053:51) .  
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participate in the 1994 Vietnam Update to which he had been 
invited by the ANU's Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies. 
In March 1994 authorities did arrest - again - Nguyen Ho 
for circulating a paper he had written (Agence France Presse 22 
March 1994, FBIS-EAS-94-055, 22 March 1994:55-56) . Among 
other things, the paper critically assessed socialism, called for 
'pluralist democracy' (chinh tri da nguyen-dan chua da dang) , 
urged a new constitutional convention, and accused the 
Communist Party of having committed numerous crimes, 
including killing several opponents (Nguyen Ho 1994:42, 
pa s s i m ) .  Upon arrest, he was charged with spreading 
propaganda against the 'regime and state' (che do va nha nuoc) 
and provoking 'doubt and division' (hoai nghi chia re) between 
the people and officials.25 A former National Liberation Front 
guerrilla, Nguyen Ho previously was under house arrest for 
nearly three years between 1990 · and 1993 after having 
attempted to form a veterans association independent of the FF 
and Communist Party. Reportedly the 78-year-old Nguyen Ho 
is now home but under surveillance (Dan Viet [Cabramatta, 
NSW], 11 August 1994:1) 
Meanwhile, the government feels domestic and 
international pressures to release prominent prisoners who 
have advocated peaceful change to more democratic forms of 
government. Doan Viet Hoat, one of the writers of Freedom 
Forum, a mimeographed newsletter circulated in late 1989-early 
1990 that advocated free speech and political pluralism, has 
since August 1993 been serving a fifteen year prison term.26 
While his wife and others in Vietnam plead with authorities to 
release him, PEN American Center, an . affiliate of the 
international association of writers (PEN) bestowed on him the 
25 The charges appear in documents from the People's Committee, 
Ho Chi Minh City, printed at the end of Nguyen Ho 1994:45-48. 
26 The short lived newsletter 's articles, together with other related 
materials, appear in Doan Viet Hoat (1993). 
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organization's 1994 Freedom-to Write Award.27 Similarly, 
Amnesty International has taken up the case of Nguyen Dan 
Que, who serves a twenty-year prison term after publicly 
advocating a multiparty system (Asian Wall S treet Journal 9 
September 1993) . International pressure may have contributed 
to the release in May 1995 of Quach Vinh Nien, who had been 
sentenced to sixteen years, reportedly for publishing 
newspapers articles critical of the Communist Party 's  
domination over the country's government. He has been 
p-2rmitted to join his family in Australia (Independen t, SEASIA-L 
[Internet] 26 May 1994) . 
Among the several individuals in recent months who have 
been openly advocating an end to a single-party, Communist 
Party dominated political system is Father Chan Tin, a 
Redemptorist priest in Ho Chi Minh City. Despite having also 
been under house arrest in 1990-93, he wrote in March 1994 a 
scathing critique of Secretary General Do Muoi's speeches, 
ending with a word of advice for the Communist Party: 'If it 
wants to survive, [ it] needs to orient itself to the people's 
wishes, to accept democracy, to respect individual integrity, to 
respect civil and human rights, and to accept pluralism' (Chan 
Tin 1994) . Duong Quynh Hoa, a paediatrician who was once 
prominent in the Communist Party in southern Vietnam, has 
frequently criticized party and government policy. She is 
quoted as saying the 'system is too rigid. Our leaders don't 
have enough knowledge to run the country. They're very 
dictatorial, and are only trying to keep their seats' (FEER 2 
December 1993:90) . 
Besides possibly the sheer desire to keep power for its own 
sake and protect their self interests, why do top Communist 
Party leaders oppose opening up the political system more 
rapidly, particularly allowing for more than one political party? 
One central reason is the fear that Vietnam would revert to 
instability, chaos, and possibly civil war. Leaders worry that 
lingering legacies of past deep divisions within the country 
27 Letter from PEN American Center to Secretary General Do Muoi, 
24 May 1994, SEASIA-L (Internet), 13 June 1994. 
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could burst out and obliterate the country's achievements if the 
political system suddenly thrown open. It is a concern of even 
critics like Duong Quynh Hoa, who believes that political 
change must be slow. 'For us it's very difficult to talk about 
democracy. We never had democracy in Vietnam so must set it 
up step by step. I want democracy, but I don't want anarchy' 
(quoted in FEER 2 December 1993:90) . Ordinary people have 
expressed fears that rapid political change would bring the 
misery and chaos they hear about from eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union.28 Even those with little sympathy for the 
present system, argues Do Muoi, recognize that pluralization at 
this time would significantly jeopardize achievements thus far 
in economic recovery, improved living conditions of people, 
and the country's independence (Do Muoi 1994b:3). 
Many Vietnamese authorities also believe that advocates for 
a multi-party system, Western-style democracy, etc., are part of 
a larger movement opposed to Vietnam as it is presently 
constituted. The movement, according to this interpretation, is 
a continuation of the 'peaceful evolution' strategy used since 
the late 1940s by imperialists and other enemies of Vietnam's 
struggle for independence. The strategy's aim is to gradually 
subvert and bring down the Communist Party and its 
government and to deny Vietnam its right to independence and 
self-determination. Official alarms against subversion by 
'peaceful evolution' (dien bien hoa binh) have been numerous 
since the early 1990s, and appear to have accelerated after the 
United States lifted the trade embargo in February 1994. 
Speaking to party cadres in March, Secretary General Do Muoi 
warned that while the end to the embargo creates many 
positive opportunities for Vietnam, it also creates opportunities 
for 'hostile influences' to intensify 'peaceful evolution activities 
and plots' (ibid . :2) .  At conferences, meetings, and seminars 
provincial and district cadre have been told to vigilantly guard 
28 Conversations with villagers in the Red River delta, April and 
May 1993. 
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against those involved in this 'peaceful evolution' strategy.29 
Earlier, in January, the party's Mid Term Conference declared 
that one of the four greatest dangers facing the country now is 
the 'violent subversion plot' represented by 'peaceful 
evolution' (Communist Party 1994 [068] :77) . Specific groups 
and activities exemplifying this threat, according to party 
leaders, include numerous organizations abroad led by former 
South Vietnam government officials and those foreign and local 
Vietnamese arrested in March 1993 for plotting to set off bombs 
in Ho Chi Minh City. Even some of those who advocate only 
peaceful methods and were former supporters like Nguyen Ho 
are sometimes included among those involved in this strategy 
(Ideology Committee 1994) . 
This context of top leaders being agitated about the threat 
they perceive from 'peaceful evolution' may help to account for 
their actions that provoked the cancellation of a planned 
Australian parliamentary delegation in July 1994. Vietnam 
authorities refused to grant a visa to Quang Luu, a member of 
the intended delegation, on the grounds that he had told the 
BBC on June 27 that the purpose of the trip was to examine the 
humah rights situation in Vietnam. Not only is that topic a very 
sensitive subject as far as Vietnamese leaders are concerned, 
but their understanding was that a human rights investigation 
was not the purpose of the visit.30 The fact that Quang Luu, an 
Australian citizen who heads SBS radio's ethnic minority 
service, had once been an official in the South Vietnam regime 
29 See, for instance, the account of a seminar in Thai Binh province to 
'fighting against [the] peaceful evolution strategy of hostile forces' 
(Voice of Vietnam [14 April 1994], FBIS-EAS-94-077, 21 April 1994:59-
60). Also see speech by Senior Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang 
(Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan, FBIS-EAS-94-073, 15 April 1994:54-56) 
and statement by radio station editor Vu Dinh Vinh (Voice of 
Vietnam [22 February 1994], FBIS-EAS-94-037, 24 February 1994:53-
55). 
30 Vietnam News Agency [14 December 1993], BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 16 December 1993, FE/1873/B/ ll; Voice of Vietnam 
[5 July 1994], BBC Monitoring Service: Asia Pacific, 7 July 1994. 
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made authorities in Hanoi all the more nervous and upset. 
After they refused Quang Luu a visa, the Australian 
government decided to protest by cancelling the trip. 
Another part of an explanation for why Vietnam authorities 
are extremely suspicious of even moderate, low-keyed calls for 
more latitude to organize and engage in political activities 
independent of the Communist Party may be their socialist 
ideology and understanding of Marxism. For them, as for many 
Marxists, a more open political social order allows for -
indeed encourages - the rise of self-centred, self-serving 
narrow interests that are not concerned with others in society.31 
Most dangerous would be the rise of organizations and 
political parties serving capitalists' interests that are opposed to 
and could displace the interests of workers and the peasantry, 
which the Communist Party claims to serve and believes 
should be foremost. This is the situation, party officials 
frequently argue, in the United States and other Western 
democracies, political system which Vietnam should avoid, not 
emulate (Do Muoi 1994b:3-4} . 
Summary and reflections 
I have argued that the political leadership in Vietnam, 
particularly of the Communist Party, has put a lot of stock in 
economic growth and related improvements to bolster support 
in society for the political system. To a considerable extent, this 
emphasis appears to have earned the political system more 
legitimacy than it otherwise would have had, especially had 
economic conditions continued in the dismal direction that they 
were going during the late 1970s and early 1980s. But with 
success has also come social issues and discontent, which have 
become significant political problems. Several of these have 
been particularly apparent during the last year . One is 
widening scepticism if not opposition in society and even 
within state institutions to socialism as an ideology, yet the 
31 For the general argument about Marxism in this regard, see the 
Manfred Henningsen's informative analysis (1992) . 
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national' s political leadership continues to insist that Vietnam 
is a socialist society, following a socialist path to development. 
Another problem is a range of adverse social changes that have 
arisen as the state has receded from trying to control 
production and distribution and as a market system, which 
increasingly looks like many others in Asia, has expanded. 
Rising unemployment, widening differences between the 
wealthy and the poor, and more prostitution and drug 
addiction cause policymakers considerable concern. The one 
that has been the most politically difficult is labour unrest, 
including numerous strikes during in recent years . Such 
discontent influenced the National Assembly to pass a new 
labour code in mid 1994 that legalizes certain kinds of strikes. A 
more serious political challenge for the regime is corruption. 
People from many sectors of society and within various 
quarters of the state are outraged at authorities who abuse their 
privileged position for personal gain. While leaders have been 
assuring the Vietnamese people that their anti-corruption 
campaign is serious, they have been struggling to be 
convincing. The last political problem discussed in this chapter 
is the damour from Buddhist organizations, other groups, and 
numerous individuals that the political system change in order 
to accommodate dissent and political opposition. This has 
brought out sharply the disjuncture between the political 
leaders' claims and efforts to be more open and inclusive, one 
one hand, and their often suspicious, hostile, or furious 
responses, on the other, to pressures for changing the political 
system. 
This brief examination of the politics of society in Vietnam 
brings out an aspect of state-society relations having to do with 
the intermingling of the two. 'State' and 'society' are often 
conceptualized by analysts as though they are distinct arenas; 
and relations between them are seen as relations between two 
entities, each trying to influence, exercise power over, or be 
separate from the other. At one level, analyses along this line 
make sense. After all, in most countries, the military, police, 
courts, taxation offices, and so forth are identifiable institutions 
of the state, often distinguishable enough from other 
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institutions in society. To society, they often are places to avoid, 
if possible; people rarely want to be at the mercy of the power 
that state institutions can wield. Typically citizens feel 
vulnerable and relatively powerless before institutions of the 
state. On the other hand, state institutions can be places to 
which people in society turn for help, look to for services, and 
so forth - a reasonable approach that again suggests that state 
and society are separate. 
Thinking of them as separate in Vietnam makes sense, too, 
to a degree. This chapter highlights, for instance, that one of the 
reasons corruption has become a significant political problem 
for the state is the considerable protest against it by villagers 
and others in society. Also, because one of the major political 
questions in Vietnam is the extent to which social activities, 
organizations, etc., can be distant, distinct, or autonomous from 
state institutions and control, it is reasonable to look for 
evidence of groups in the sphere of .:society' that are trying to 
do that. Pertinent examples cited in this chapter are the Unified 
Buddhist Church of Vietnam, some non-government 
organizations, and groups and associations of labourers who 
have protested against working conditions and gone on strike, 
defying in the process the law and the state's labour federation. 
But taken too literally, treating state and society as separate 
entities has pitfalls. One is that it can blind or deflect analysis 
away from important places and events for the politics of state­
society relations. State and society are often intermingled .  
Educational institutions like universities, for example, are 
frequently neither exclusively state nor exclusively societal but 
both, and often places of conflict and negotiation about state­
society relations . Banks and other financial institutions 
comprise other examples. The intermingling of private and 
public resources may be a means to perpetuate state power, or 
for private investors to increase power by tapping into and 
having backing and protection of state monies, police, or other 
resources (Mitchell 1991 :89-90) . While the state can shape 
society, social forces can influence the state as well, and not just 
from the outside but also from inside. This dynamic is easier to 
see in relatively 'open' political systems such as liberal 
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democracies than in 'authoritarian' or 'totalitarian' systems. But 
such interactions can be important for explaining significant 
shifts in these more 'closed' political systems. Institutions and 
organizations that are part of the 'state' can be agents of and 
avenues for change by social forces within them. Hence, one 
would want to look at state institutions for evidence of 
struggles regarding issues of autonomy and control. 
Studies of authoritarian regimes highlight the importance 
of organizations created by or closely associated with the 
regime becoming sources of advocates for pushing the political 
system to become less authoritarian and/ or more democratic 
(Zhang 1994; Huntington 1991) .  In the Soviet Union during the 
1960s-1980s, writes Moshe Lewin (1988:79-81), a myriad of 
associations and networks arose in the ' . . .  bosom of a system 
that is statist par excellence' .  Some existed and acted 
independently of the state, while others were 'official 
organizations capable of developing their own spontaneous 
views on national or local issues and then impressing these 
views on their members, on small groups and, finally, on the 
authorities' . Independent trends and groups appeared 'among 
the Soviet state bureaucracies' .  Public opinion and reactions 
penetrated 'state bodies and the party . . .  ', meeting 'with either 
opposition or sympathy from state officials' .  Administrators 
often partook of 'the opinions prevalent in different strata of 
society at large'. All such networks and organizations, whether 
inside or outside institutions of the state, Lewin concludes, 
were part of an emerging 'civil society' . Similar phenomena are 
found in China during the late 1970s and 1980s, though X.L. 
Ding calls what occurred inside the state 'institutional 
parasitism' rather than an aspect of civil society (Ding 1994: 26-
2 7) .32 Ding finds in research organizations, universities, 
bureaucracies, and other government institutions that 
intellectuals and other counter-political elites were challenging 
the ideas and policies of the ruling elite and using official and 
32 Ding thinks 'civil society' should be reserved to refer to 
organizations, associations, etc., that are fully outside the state and in 
opposition to the prevailing political order (1994:25-26, 35) .  
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semi-officials institutions like 'parasites' to create alternative 
networks and associations that fed into the 1989 democracy 
movement. 
Something along this line seems to be happening in 
Vietnam as well, indicated by examples in this chapter. 
Arguments against the utility and value of a socialist ideology 
arise within a range of state institutions, including the 
Communist Party itself. Organizations created by various 
ministries and bureaus are pursuing programs not entirely in 
accord with those state institutions' objectives and are trying to 
become more independent. Within the General Confederation 
of Labour, an organization headed by high-ranking Communist 
Party leaders and under the official Fatherland Front, there is 
considerable tension as some members try to turn it into an 
advocate for workers ' interests rather than a conduit for the 
party's directives and to distance it from the state. A number of 
individuals, like Ha Si Phu and Nguyen Thanh Giang, who are 
critical of the present political system are themselves employed 
by institutions of the state. Others noted in this chapter, such as 
Nguyen Ho and Duong Quynh Hoa, are former party members 
and government officials who, though now outside the state, 
still have family members and friends inside who sympathize 
with them and, one can imagine, carry their complaints into 
official meetings and deliberations. 

Chapter 3 
Changing Labour Relations 
Stephanie Fahey 
Introduction 
Significant changes have occurred in Vietnam during the past 
seven years with the progressive shift from a centrally planned 
economy to one dominated by the market. This shift has 
generated a new complex of interest groups which regularly 
play out the fundamental contradictions which exist between 
them. At the heart of economic reform is the changing set of 
labour relations brought about by the rationalization of state­
owned enterprises (SOEs) and the growth of private enterprise 
and foreign investment. The challenge for the Vietnamese 
government is to effectively manage this change. The new 
Labour Code approved in July 1994 by the ninth National 
Assembly was an attempt to the regularize labour relations. 
The implementation of the code, however, which is scheduled 
for 1 January 1995, is expected to be slow and regionally 
uneven. 
This chapter provides an overview of some aspects of 
Vietnam's labour market and current labour relations . 
Contemporary changes are described: increased unemployment 
resulting from structural adjustment and youth entering the 
work force and the differential impact of unemployment on 
women, industrial sectors and regions; the apparent 
inescapability of poor working conditions including low levels 
of pay and occupational health and safety risks; and increased 
labour disputes along with protests from private entrepreneurs 
against increase government charges. The government's  
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response to increased levels of unemployment and labour 
disputes include redundancy packages, reform of the salary 
schedules, and more formal means to ease unemployment. The 
introduction of the new Labour Code, which formalizes trade 
unions and their right to strike, is an attempt by the state to 
withdraw from direct involvement in the activities of 
enterprises. These changes have significant implications for 
foreign investors. 
A conceptual change in labour relations 
Under doi moi (economic renovation), the command economy in 
Vietnam has undergone substantive changes with the gradual 
demise of SOEs and the continued emergence of powerful 
Vietnamese private-sector and joint-ventures companies. 
During this transition, not only has structural adjustment given 
rise to an altered distribution of labour across economic sectors 
and geographic regions, but also the nature of the relationship 
between employer and employee has fundamentally changed. 
Within a command economy, labour is not conceived of as 
a cotrimodity to be bought and sold at the value of the work 
done. Hence, labour relations are not those between employer 
and employee . Rather the director of the enterprise is 
considered to be a manager of state assets and the state is a 
state of the workers. 
With the transition to a market economy, labour in Vietnam 
is increasingly becoming a commodity. This has a number of 
implications both for the organization and operation of sectors 
of the labour market as well as the playing out of labour 
relations. 
Structural adjustment in the labour force 
Under the command economy, labour was tied to SOEs and 
agricultural and handicraft cooperatives and collectives. The 
economy was centrally planned and production targets 
established for units. Consideration of the efficiency of labour 
in these units was of low priority whereas full employment was 
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considered a necessity. With the introduction of market 
economic principles, substantial structural adjustments in 
labour allocation are required. 
The decline of employment in the SOEs has gone some way 
to improving productivity, but officers of the Ministry for 
Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs (MOUSA) that over 
25 per cent of those employed in SOEs are redundant. 
Between 1989 and 1993, 1 .5 million state workers have become 
unemployed, retired or reduced to part-time work as a result of 
the dissolution or restructuring of 2,000 SOEs, according to 
Nguyen Van Tu, chairman of the Vietnam General 
Confederation of Labour (VGCL) (Vietnam Investment Review, 
22-28 November 1993) and each year over one million 
Vietnamese youth reach the age of employment. While some 
have been absorbed by the private sector, others have remained 
unskilled and jobless. 
Rationalization of SOEs is essential for the development of 
a market economy. Newly formed profit-making ambitions of 
directors of SOEs are plagued by significant overemployment, 
caused by existing excess workers and exacerbated by the 
introduction of high-tech equipment and the need for a more 
sophisticated work force in some enterprises. For example, 
from 1991 to 1992 in Hanoi, almost 54,000 workers were made 
redundant. In Minh Khai weaving mill over 700 workers were 
laid off. In the weaving and dyeing workshop alone, the work 
force was trimmed from 550 to a little more than 100 workers 
due to overemployment and the introduction of new 
equipment. The Thang Long cigarette company laid off nearly 
400 workers, and the Hanoi bus company laid off 300 
employees (Vietnam News, 7 March 1993) . 
One of the most pressing problems in Vietnam is the high 
rate of unemployment and underemployment, although the 
official unemployment rate is only 7.37 per cent (Ministry of 
Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 1994:36) . The problem 
cannot be solved by old-style bureaucratic centralization or a 
Western-style headlong rush into private enterprise abandoning 
social justice according to Vu Oanh, a member of the Politburo 
(Vietnam Investment Review, 16-22 May 1994) . His concern is 
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underlined by the World Bank's lack of attention to rising rates 
of unemployment in its review of public sector management 
and the private sector incentives. This report assumes the 
necessity for transition from state involvement in the more 
lucrative sectors of the economy such as energy to 
infrastructure and human resource development. The private 
sector is expected to absorb redundant labour and the 
government is expected to ease the temporary poverty which 
arises from this transition (World Bank 1994) . 
A difficulty for SOEs is the 'brain-drain' from the SOEs to 
the private sector as skilled workers shift to higher incomes. 
The private . sector has drawn between 80-85 per cent of its 
skilled work force from the SOEs to the 70 per cent of workers 
in foreign-invested companies are from SOEs ( Vi e t n a m  
Investment Review, 20-26 December 1993) . In retaliation, some 
directors of SOEs are demanding compensation payments from 
employees for training given to the staff member. That is illegal 
unless a contract has been signed to this effect (Vie t n a m  
Investment Review, 25 April-1 May 1994) . 
Even though unemployment rates are high, labour shortages 
exist in particular sectors. A report issued by the Ho Chi Minh 
City government at the end of 1993 noted that although over 
half the residents of Ho Chi Minh City of working age are 
unemployed, many branches are short of workers in such areas 
as construction, transport, and mechanical engineering, child 
care and house-keeping (Vietnam Inves tment Review, 20-26 
December 1993) .  Branches which continue to attract workers 
include textiles, food-processing, rubber production, chemical 
industry and wood-processing. Similarly, labour shortages also 
exist for skilled college and university graduates. At the same 
time many graduates remain unemployed due to the lack of 
coordination between education-planning priorities and labour 
market needs. Although these maladjustments may be short­
term, it illustrates the problems which structural adjustment 
create in the labour market. 
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The changing position of women in the labour market 
During Vietnam's wars, women were highly represented in the 
labour force. With the unfolding of economic reforms, however, 
women have lost proportional representation. As SOEs have 
rationalized, the loss of female labour has been faster than 
male labour. According to the VGCL, although women made up 
49 per cent of total state employment in 1989, in 1992 it had 
declined to 47 per cent indicating a more rapid drop in female 
state employment with state rationalization. It is not unusual 
that women are the first victims of unemployment. The reasons 
given for the more rapid rates of unemployment by various 
women's groups in Vietnam focus on the lack of training of 
women, their poor health, health-related costs such as 
maternity benefits and absenteeism due to child care and other 
family responsibilities. 
Women in Vietnam are still expected to take care of the 
domestic arrangements of shopping, cooking and cleaning as 
well as meeting family responsibilities for ceremonies such as at 
Tet (Vietnamese New Year), funerals and weddings. As a 
consequence, women, and especially married women, are 
leaving paid employment within state and private enterprise 
and opting for more flexible arrangements as petty traders. 
Under communism, the state introduced regulations to 
protect women's rights: the free choice of wedding partners, the 
right to work, the responsibility of men to share housework and 
affirmative action to promote higher education for women. As 
the state withdraws from the provision of social services such 
as subsidized child care, health care and school fees, these 
responsibilities are falling back onto women. This may decrease 
government expenditure on social services and reduce the 
unemployment levels but it discriminates on the basis of gender 
and enforces women's retreat from public life. 
During the immediate post-war period, women were highly 
represented in the labour force. Even in 1992-93, 52 per cent of 
those employed were women and 92 per cent of economically 
active women were employees (State Planning Committee and 
General Statistics Office 1994) . Although no detailed statistics 
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are available, it appears that they concentrated in occupations 
of low skill and high labour intensity. Women in the urban 
areas concentrate in the industrial groups of wholesale and 
retail trade and restaurants; manufacturing; agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishery; and community, social and 
community services (ibid. ). Until 'renovation', women were not 
disadvantaged with respect to pay as workers were paid 
according to their need rather than their responsibility or 
output. With salary reform and the creation of a labour market, 
the lack of skill and training for women became more obvious 
as unskilled women workers began to lose their jobs and 
congregate at the most lowly paid end of the newly created pay 
scales. 
Some have suggested that women were in fact the 
instigators of increased private sector activity in Vietnam 
during the 1980s. Women progressively moved into petty trade, 
a sector which they continue to dominate . Women are also 
highly represented in other private sector activities .  For 
example, many of the growth industries for foreign investors 
are those which traditionally employ women including textiles, 
garment production, leather products and food stuff 
processing. Women workers make up between 55 to 87 per cent 
of the labour force (Bui Thi Kim Quy 1994) . 
But conditions for women in Vietnam's work force appear 
to have deteriorated with their increased private sector 
activity. For example, a recent survey of thirteen enterprises 
with foreign capital which predominantly employ women was 
conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences in Ho Chi Minh 
City. The survey found that the women were young (i.e. 70 per 
cent of women were between 18-30 years) and usually single 
(i.e. 60 per cent) (ibid . ) .  Nevertheless, most women found it 
difficult to maintain their family and social commitments as 
well as maintain full-time work in which they were expected to 
work overtime every two days from 7.00am to 9 .00pm and on 
weekends. 
Other indicators which point to the deterioration of 
women's conditions are the reduced female membership of the 
national assemblies from over 27 per cent in 1976-81 to a 
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current membership of only 18  per cent. 1 Proportional 
representation of women has also declined in people 's 
committees, at commune-level administration and as ministers 
and vice-ministers . In 1992, women chiefs of departments are 
only 13 per cent and directors of SOE are only 3 per cent 
(Vietnam General Confederation of Labour 1993) . 
The emergence of casual labour markets 
Since the introduction of doi moi, labour has become 
increasingly responsive to market demands. For example, 
labour migrates on a short term basis especially after the 
seasonal harvests when less work is required in the fields and 
others on a longer term basis in search of appropriate 
employment. In the early stages of economic reform, increased 
employment opportunities emerged first in the countryside. 
Migrant labourers moved within the countryside to work in 
forestry or mining gem stones. As economic reform affected the 
cities, rural-urban migration began, though the rate is unknown 
because people who come to the city from the countryside 
rarely register. In fact, many provincial government officers give 
the required papers to young men to allow them to engage in 
urban migration labour with the understanding that some of the 
money comes back to the village. 
These unofficial city-dwellers reside in 'labour markets' or 
'student villages' .  In the outlying villages of Hanoi, day 
labourers gather at Bat Trang pottery village 10 kilometres 
southwest of Hanoi and at Ninh Hiep fabric market 12 
kilometres north of Hanoi. In Hanoi, labour markets exist just 
metres away from Hang Da market, north of Hoan Kiem Lake 
· where carpenters from the countryside gather with their tools 
mounted on their bicycles, and on the median strip of Giang Vo 
and Minh Khai Street and Giai Phong Boulevard labour market 
where people from the countryside gather from 5.00am and 
await casual work as porters, waiters, construction assistants, 
1 The statistics come from a 1993 table provided by the National 
Assembly office in Hanoi. 
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house cleaners, for washing or cattle raising. These labour 
markets which spontaneously emerged about two to three years 
ago are becoming increasingly organized by agents . For 
example, one Hanoi family has taken the initiative to organize 
parts of this casual market. They have organized over 100 
porters (locally known as cuu van after a figure on a Chinese 
playing card) to provide labour for construction sites. Foremen 
directly contact the family who provide a gang of labourers and 
take about 15 per cent of the wage as a fee. They also provide 
accommodation in their home for some at VNDl,000 
(US$0.10) per night in their home (Vietnam Investment Review, 
21-27 November, 1994b).  Cyclo drivers are another example 
of a migrant labour, many of whom come from the countryside 
and hire a cyclo to become full-time drivers. 
Under the planned economy, college and university 
graduates were employed by the government. Now, however, 
they are required to find their own employment. Graduates 
from the countryside often chose to continue to reside in urban 
areas and engage in casual labour such as tutoring of high 
school students. An example of a 'student village' of this kind 
is Bach Hoa near the Hanoi University of Technology. 
Nowadays, many universities have set up relations with labour 
promotion centres to assist their graduates in job search 
activities. 
The increase in the number of labour disputes 
Substantial structural adjustment in any economy is bound to 
cause dissatisfaction. This has been expressed not only by 
workers in the form of wild cat strikes but also by private 
entrepreneurs who protest against new taxes and advantages 
given to foreign investors. 
With the separation of interests of employers and 
employees under a market economy, several labour disputes 
have occurred particularly in the past two years with over 40 
such strikes being recorded, principally in joint ventures and 
100 per cent foreign-invested companies in Ho Chi Minh City 
although increasingly in Vietnamese state-owned and private 
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enterprises . Although problems did occur in pre-renovation 
Vietnam, most of those conflicts concerned the lack of 
democracy in the management of the enterprise rather than pay 
as there was little differentiation between wage levels, which 
were set by the state. Furthermore, disputes were limited by the 
lack of any formal mechanism for resolution. Most of the recent 
conflicts have arisen in textile, garment and shoe-making 
enterprises with foreign capital from South Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong (Hiebert 1993a: l6} . The workers' major complaints, 
according to Hoang Thi Khanh, president of Ho Chi Minh 
City 's  Federation of Labour, have been over low pay, 
compulsory overtime and rude treatment of workers by foreign 
managers ( ibid . ) . Fewer than 20 per cent of the 252 joint­
venture enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City have labour contracts 
with their 16,000 workers and only 15 per cent have labour 
unions. 
Conditions for workers in most sectors are poor with 
particular problems in occupational health and safety. Old and 
outdated equipment are still in operation, giving rise to serious 
industrial accidents. Another implication of the high levels of 
unemployment is the disinclination of workers to insist on 
better physical working conditions. Rather than issues of  
occupational health and safety, protests generally focus on pay 
scales, physical abuse and dignity issues. 
Nevertheless, a 1993 report of the Institute of Scientific and 
Technical Research of Labour Safety under the VGCL 
summarized by the Vietnam Investment Review (4-10 October 
1993) found that labour accidents and occupational disease 
was increasing especially in the private sector. In many 
enterprises, noxious exposure is beyond permitted levels with 
the presence of lead in the Thanh Thanh Enamel Tile Factory in 
Dong Nai Province to be 101 times required standards and 100 
per cent of workers in battery production in Ho Chi Minh City 
to have lead contamination. These problems will likely continue 
at least in the mid term due to the lack of information and 
education of workers with respect to these issues together with 
the pressure on workers of high rates of unemployment. 
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Pay scales in Vietnam by regional standards are low. 
Factory workers earn between US$15 to US$35 per month and 
Vietnamese managers earn less than US$500 per month 
although there is increasing pressure by deputy general 
directors in joint ventures to increase their after-tax earnings to 
US$700-l,250 per month. This is in contrast to Indonesia 
where, although factory labour rates are on par with Vietnam, 
managers rates are in excess of US$4,500 per month. In 
Thailand, factory workers are paid about US$300 per month 
with managers in excess of $3,000 per month. 
In 1991,  as additional incentive to foreign investors, the 
minimum wage for factory workers to be paid by foreign 
investors was reduced from US$50 to US$35 per month. This 
is still regarded as too high by some foreign investors who 
attempt to depress the real wage by paying below the minimum 
rate or increasing the hours worked. For example, investigation 
of a strike at Louitech Lesgo, a Taiwanese joint venture in 
December 1992 revealed that the company was only paying the 
workers a monthly salary of US$14 (Hiebert 1993a: l6). 
Workers are often expected to work nine or ten hours or at 
night with no compensation. For example, an investigation of a 
strike by 120 workers of the tailoring company Gohhsing 
(Taiwan) in Hoe District in Ho Chi Minh City in September 
1993 found that workers complained they had only received a 
US$5 advance in the past 6 weeks even though they had 
worked overtime and on Sundays (Vietnam Investment Review, 
4-10  October 1993) . Other companies hire workers on 
'probation' as 'apprentices' and use those labels to deny them 
fair wages (Vietnam Investment Review, 22-28 November 1993). 
The period for training should be established in the labour 
contract but the majority of companies have not negotiated 
these contracts. 
Foreign investors in labour-intensive industries such as 
textiles, clothing and footwear are generally from Taiwan and 
the Republic of Korea. These enterprises move investment to 
Vietnam due to the shortage and consequent high cost of labour 
at home. Furthermore, investors from these countries experience 
increasing difficulty securing markets in the EC and the USA 
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whereas Vietnamese goods in many markets are given 
preference. Nevertheless, some foreign investors experience 
difficulty in securing foreign markets and in some sectors it is 
difficult to compete in the domestic market against Vietnamese 
companies who pay lower prices for inputs such as land, 
power and water. Consequently, some foreign investors have 
difficulty meeting their wages bill. 
Labour disputes also often arise over failure of foreign 
investors to meet cultural expectations of workers . A major 
problem for Vietnamese workers with managers from Taiwan 
and Republic of Korea appears to be the social distance 
created by these managers . Vietnamese workers are familiar 
with management practice in which the director is respected 
but expected to be socially accommodating which is in contrast 
to the rigidly hierarchical management style of northeast Asian 
managers. Consequently, many of the strikes in joint ventures 
are inspired by dignity issues. 
Problems occur not only in foreign-invested companies. For 
example, in a state-owned handbag-making enterprise, Sagoda 
No. 3 in Ho Chi Minh City, a strike in October 1993 was 
sparked because the company had only paid US$4.70 in salary 
and US$7.00 in commission for the month (Vietnam Investment 
Review, 18-24 October 1993). 
The role of trade unions 
In Vietnam, trade unions are in the process of renewing their 
organization and activities to perform the function of workers' 
representatives in protecting their rights and interests . In the 
past, they existed only as part of the state sector and were 
organized to promote political unity. 
In the past, the management of SOEs was through four 
positions: the Communist Party representative, the director, the 
trade union representative and the representative of the Youth 
Union. The party official carried the most power. Often the 
trade union representative was either the deputy party 
representative or deputy director and in this respect was seen 
as closely linked to management. In fact, union leaders saw 
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their major task as assisting management to meet enterprise 
production targets and assuring the enforcement of government 
labour laws and policies. The priorities of the union were to 
participate in administration, to educate workers and to 
defend workers' rights whereas their new set of priorities 
reverse this order with the primary role being to protect the 
material interests of its members. 
In reality, many trade union leaders see themselves more in 
the role of mediator rather than workers' representative. For 
example, in a dispute at the Viet Thang tailoring company the 
trade union requested the director to take disciplinary action 
against a supervisor who insulted a worker and asked the 
workers for restraint (Vietnam Investment Review, 16-22 August 
1993) . Other actions by trade unions have been to persuade 
employers to increase hazardous work, lunch and relief 
allowances; to strictly adhere to minimum wage levels and 
work and rest hours; and to allow the formation of trade 
unions. More recently, trade union leaders in Ho Chi Minh City 
have called for a nationwide hike in the minimum wage from 
US$35 to US$50, a suggestion likely to be rejected by 
government ( Vietnam Investmen t Review, 21-27 November 
1994) . Nevertheless, it is an attempt by unions to act publicly 
on behalf of employees. 
The trade union movement was born during French colonial 
rule with the formation of the Northern Red Trade Union, 
which first convened in 1929 in Hanoi. The union was initially 
organized as an underground political arm of the Communist 
Party around local cells. The formal Yellow Trade Union 
structure was organized according to occupation. The French 
colonist also organized a trade union . During French 
colonialism, Vietnamese workers were exposed to brutality 
and long working hours of between 12 to 16 hours a day not 
only by the colonists but also indigenous feudalists .  The 
Northern Red Trade Union was the predecessor of the VGCL 
and this was supported by the publication of Nguoi Lao Dong, 
the labour weekly. The political heritage of the trade union 
movement in the north contributes to its unusual structure of 
the dominance of locality-based unions rather than occupation 
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unions. In the south, before 1975, the trade union movement 
was actively linked to the Brotherhood of Asia Trade Unions 
as part of the Christian-influenced World Confederation of 
Labour and participated in international conferences. Under 
communism, the southern trade union movement was absorbed 
into the northern structure. 
Recent experience in Song Be province illustrates the 
historical connection between French colonial history and 
contemporary labour disputes . Song Be province has a long 
history of strikes and workers action. Tens of thousands were 
employed in virtual slave-labour conditions on rubber 
plantations there during the French colonial rule. More recently, 
Song Be has been the site of several major labour disputes. For 
example, at the privately owned Thai Binh shoe factory whose 
workers went on strike on 15 October 1993 (Vietnam Investment 
Review, 25-31 October 1993), and in April 1994, 3,600 workers 
in the state-owned Thanh Le cashew nut-processing factory in 
Song Be held a ten-day stoppage demanding better pay and 
conditions and expressing disapproval of the management 
style of the newly appointed director (Vietnam Investmen t 
Review, 25 April-1 May 1994) . 
The drive for the right to strike has come from the workers 
rather than the VGCL which appears keen to use strikes as a 
last resort and to maintain Vietnam as an attractive climate for 
foreign investment. Advice given to the VGCL through their 
international affiliations has warned of the dangers of 
transnational corporations, but the Confederation intends to 
encourage transnational investment. Nguyen Van Tu, chairman 
of the VGCL, stated that the role of trade unions was 'to 
protect the worker's legal rights without causing bad influences 
to the economic development and political stability of the 
country' (Vietnam Investment Review, 22-28 November 1993). In 
fact, Tu earlier in the debate argued against the right to strike, 
fearing it may be abused for political purposes. Apparently, 
some workers are reluctant to support trade unions as they 
believe that officials are too easily co-opted by company 
bosses. 
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Under the command economy, trade unions were limited to 
the public sector even though a substantial private sector 
operated within 'the hidden economy' (Fahey 1994) .  But by the 
end of 1993, only 4.4 per cent of the 2.5 million workers in non­
SOEs were unionized (Vietnam Investment Review, 22-28 
November 1993) . There were 44,000 members of 480 non-state 
trade unions and 58,000 members in 324 trade associations for 
professional workers. Even so, a 1993 report from the VGCL 
noted that the development of trade unions in the non-state 
sector is too slow (Vietnam Investment Review, 16-22 August 
1993) . Although it generated 60 per cent of GDP, only 10 per 
cent of private enterprises have labour union organizations. 
The report suggests that low membership in the private 
sector is because both the employee and employer see little 
effective outcomes from union involvement in labour relations 
( ibid . ) .  Some joke that 'the trade union is as the breast of a 
man' :  it is necessary for appearances but has no function. 
Nevertheless, it is encouraging that the problems faced by the 
trade union movement are discussed so frankly within the 
union newspaper. Other criticisms of the trade union 
organization concern its large bureaucracy and ownership of 
enterprises such as construction firms, tourist agencies and 
more recently a joint-stock bank (Vietnam Investment Review, 
5-1 1 December 1994) . 
The major challenge which faces the trade union movement 
in Vietnam is credibility in its representation of labour, a 
challenge not unlike that which faces the Communist Party as a 
manager of a market-oriented economy. Does the trade union 
movement need to be independent from government to be 
effective? Could the trade union movement be financially viable 
or enjoy its current level of freedom of expression without 
government support? How will it continue to fund its activities 
with declining membership in the state sector which is not 
compensated for by the private sector? These questions will 
need to be resolved in the coming years. 
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Government response 
As unemployment increases, household incomes decline. The 
impact of unemployment is aggravated in many transitional 
economies because severed ties with the enterprise means that 
access to basic social services and other mechanisms of social 
protection are impeded. Furthermore, stress is created in 
households as access to income is potentially under threat as 
SOEs one by one dissolve. This level of stress is exaggerated in 
economies where in the past, although the level of existence 
was basic, at least it was assured. Older people who depend 
on the financial solvency of their children appear to be worst 
affected by this stress . 
Easing the social costs of what is hoped to be 'transitional 
unemployment' is one of the greatest challenges for the Vietnam 
Communist Party which sewed its roots in the nationalist 
campaign against the exploitative labour practices of the 
French colonialists and their sympathizers. The hope of the 
state is that the emerging private sector will absorb the 
increasing number of unemployed. Of concern is that in the 
current period of excessive unemployment, labour is more 
susceptible to abuse. The new Labour Code in Vietnam has 
gone some way to introducing necessary labour protection 
legislation. Furthermore, the government has attempted to ease 
the burden of 'transitional unemployment' by sponsoring 
retraining programs, creating job creation schemes, allocating 
business start-up loans for redundant workers and encouraging 
the export of labour to labour-short countries of the Asia 
region. 
Central to the task of economic reform in labour relations in 
Vietnam is to change from a situation of government direct 
intervention at the enterprise level to that of enterprise 
autonomy based on market adjustment and to progressively 
introduce legislation in order to manage this transition. 
Redundancy packages 
Theoretically, under decisions taken in 1989, those made 
redundant from SOEs were entitled to payouts which would 
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assist them to  start a new business in the thriving service sector 
(e.g. baby-sitting, hairdressing, deaning, snack-selling. Because 
many SOEs, however, were cash-strapped, they registered 
debts with their former employees or paid them with whatever 
products were left unsold by the enterprise. For some workers, 
a promise of an eventual payout was never realistic. This 
policy fell short of launching former SOE workers into the 
private sector. 
Salary package reform 
Fundamental alterations in the salary structure have also 
become necessary in the market economy of Vietnam although 
economists express some apprehension as the last salary 
reform in 1985 contributed to spiralling inflation. Exceedingly 
low wages gave rise to corruption and absenteeism as state 
employees looked for alternative sources of income to feed their 
families. The new structure aims to end the old egalitarian wage 
system in which levels of salary were based on length of service 
and not at a level which could support the worker or the 
family. Rather, workers are supposed to be paid according to 
their skills, responsibility and productivity. In the former 
system, the highest salary was only 3.5 times greater than the 
lowest salary. The new scheme allows a range of thirteen times 
as well as a cost-of-living allowance to reflect the differences 
between rural and urban (Hiebert 1993b:95). 
Furthermore, the former salary package in state businesses 
included a number of miscellaneous benefits. These included 
subsidized health care and housing and other bonus payments 
which covered electricity, transport costs, school fees, lunches, 
holidays and holiday bonuses (for example, for Tet) . These 
benefits came out of the earnings of the SOEs and were over 
and above the statutory levels for state employees. The new 
package attempts to regularize these profit-sharing payments 
into the salary package which would be subject to tax and in 
effect cut real wages. Under this new system, state employees 
are expected to contribute 7 per cent of their salary which will 
reimburse their medical expenses and pay retirement benefits. 
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But the introduction of the salary restructure package in April 
1993 has moved slowly and has been implemented regionally 
(ibid. ) .  While this downward pressure has been imposed on 
wages in state businesses, significant real wage gains have been 
made in the non-productive state sector (e.g. teachers and civil 
servants) with salary package reform. 
Vietnam has marketed itself to the international business 
community as a source of cheap yet highly skilled and diligent 
labour. Many investors are finding, however, that the skills 
required in certain areas are in short demand - for example, 
English language, computer literacy and international 
accounting skills. Furthermore, some entrepreneurs suggest that 
Vietnamese workers, while industrious, intelligent and quick 
learners, are also well-known for their low productivity and 
slack discipline (Vietnam Investment Review, 9-15 May 1994). 
An additional difficulty is that the expectations of workers for 
foreign companies are generally · high.  They often make 
comparisons with living standards in nearby countries. 
Whereas the expectations of those with skills are generally met 
with high wages and good conditions, for the unskilled work 
force, conditions are often inferior to those within SOEs as 
foreign investors attempt to improve the productivity / labour 
cost ratio which they still consider to be too high in Vietnam. 
'They pretend to pay us, so we pretend to work' is a common 
saying. As a consequence of mismatched expectations, labour 
disputes arise. The increasing number of labour disputes has 
brought pressure to restructure the activities of trade unions. 
Work creation schemes 
Formal strategies designed to absorb the increasing ranks of the 
unemployed include the state's work creation program in which 
workers receive rudimentary training and receive business start­
up loans, official resettlement schemes, and the export of  
labour to labour-short countries of the Asia region. However, 
these programs have met with little success and the government 
is resigned to ameliorating the impact of what it considers to be 
'transitional unemployment' to be absorbed by private sector 
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employment creation. A small business start-up loans scheme 
was commenced in Ho Chi Minh City in 1991 by MOUSA and 
later was made into a national program. This scheme offered 
loans at an interest rate of less than half that of the banks but 
to a maximum of VND5 million (US$500) .  Entrepreneurs 
complained, however, that the amount was inadequate and 
thirteen entrepreneurs by mid 1993 had refused them on this 
basis (Vietnam News, 25 July 1993) . 
Although a number of state and private and individual 
training centres have been established, they have met with little 
success due to financial shortage and the lack of training know­
how and materials. Only a few of the graduates have 
successfully entered employment. In Ho Chi Minh City at the 
end of 1993, there were seventeen district-owned and 221 
private and individual training centres. Fierce competition has 
emerged between state and private providers and it appears 
that the private providers experience greater success in 
retraining and placing workers (Vietnam Investment Review, 18-
24 October 1993). 
Resettzement schemes 
For many years the government has attempted to even out the 
geographical oversupply of labour through the resettlement of 
families to less populated areas. Nevertheless, these schemes 
have created problems for the receiving localities. For example, 
Dak Lak province in the central highlands has received 600,000 
people under the government scheme and together with 
unauthorized settlers, it has given rise to problems of 
overpopulation (Vietnam Investment Review, 5-11 April 1993) . 
The implications of increased foreign investment 
The changing nature of labour relations in Vietnam have 
important implications for foreign investors. From a positive 
viewpoint, the state is becoming less involved in the daily 
operation of enterprises by withdrawing from dispute 
resolution and an agent for the employment of workers. 
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Many of the difficulties which have arisen from structural 
changes in the labour market have been experienced by foreign 
investors. For example, most of the labour disputes to date 
have been in joint-venture enterprises . Numerous cases have 
been reported of foreign investment enterprises who have not 
fulfilled the required labour regulations concerning labour 
contracts, labour registration, social insurance funds and 
collective welfare funds. 
Foreign investors have varied experiences depending on the 
sector of their investment. For example, foreign investors who 
have come to Vietnam to take advantage of low labour rates in 
low-technology, labour-intensive industries, attempt to reduce 
labour costs through extending the working day and reducing 
wages. Those investors in capital-intensive enterprise who wish 
to take advantage of resources or service sector activity may 
experience fewer difficulties. 
In Vietnam, investors from South Korea and Taiwan have 
notably experienced labour disputes in their labour-intensive 
enterprises. Due to severe domestic labour shortage, these 
companies have invested in Vietnam. Korean business clearly 
sees Vietnam as a site for low wages. This is the main 
attraction rather than benefits from government, according to 
Kirsten O'Neil' s MBA thesis from the School of International 
Studies, Yonsei University ( Vietnam Investment Review, 28 
February-6 March 1994) . Vietnamese minimum wages were 
US$35 per month rather than US$300 per month in Korea and, 
allowing for lower productivity of Vietnamese workers, Korean 
entrepreneurs found production costs 60 per cent cheaper in 
Vietnam. O'Neil nominates the conflict in management styles 
between the Vietnamese and Korean managers as one of the 
major problems for Korean business :  the long hours and self­
sacrifice by Korean managers was unacceptable to the 
Vietnamese. O'Neil uses this conflict as an explanation of the 
Korean move away from joint ventures to 100 per cent 
ownership. However, it is unlikely that labour in Vietnam will 
passively accept the Korean 'impatient' management style, 
which often translates to physical abuse of workers. 
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A major change for foreign investors over recent years is 
that foreign companies can employ labour via one of three 
means: employ through the provincial labour board or through 
provincial labour promotion centres and if one of these options 
fails, companies are free to employ through direct advertising. 
Many companies prefer to make their own appointments as the 
province then does not take fees from the workers and the 
employer has more control over who is appointed. 
The new Labour Code of 1994 
A new national Labour Code was passed by a convincing 
majority (326 of 332) at the ninth National Assembly and was 
signed by Le Due Anh, the Vietnamese president on 5 July 
1994. It has been heralded as progressive by international 
standards. The creation of a national Labour Code is an 
attempt by the state to provide a cohesive and comprehensive 
view of labour relations for the future. 
Drafting of the new Labour Code began in 1990 and went 
through over 30 revisions . The process involved extensive 
consultation with various representative bodies (for example 
the Women's Union, Youth Union, VGCL, government 
ministries, the ILO) and foreign organizations (for example, 
from the Philippines, Germany and Australia) .  Although this 
code is seen by some foreign legal practitioners as nothing more 
than a collection of past legislation, fundamental changes in the 
law were approved as well as the repeal of existing legislation 
on labour approved in June 1990 in Decree 233/HDBT. For 
example, trade unions no longer have the right of veto over the 
sacking of workers (National Assembly 1994: Chapter 14) .  
The code was potential politically sensitive. Consequently, 
so as not to alarm entrepreneurs, it was promoted primarily as 
a code to promote job creation and to serve both workers and 
employers. Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet said that the Labour 
Code 'should create favourable conditions for every labourer to 
have a job and work freely. It should protect workers' rights 
and the rights of employers as well ' (Vietnam Inves tmen t 
Review, 3-9 January 1994) . The code is fundamentally an 
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industrial code which covers only 10 per cent of the working 
population (Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
1994: 37) but it was promoted as a general labour code in order 
to gain the support of the National Assembly, which is 
dominated by rural representatives. 
The code covered four major areas: generalizations about 
the scope of application and principles, labour conditions, 
labour relations and labour administration. The most 
substantive changes occurred with respect to labour relations 
which covered the new employment contract, the collective 
agreement, a new role for the trade union and dispute 
settlement procedures. The two pronouncements which have 
received most public attention were to strengthen the worker­
representation role of trade unions and extend their presence to 
joint ventures and foreign owned companies and to legislate the 
right to strike. Theoretically, the code should reduce direct 
state management of labour disputes. All companies including 
joint ventures and 100 per cent foreign-owned companies 
should have a trade union if their workers number more than 
ten, or worker representatives for those with fewer employees. 
Under the new Labour Code, Vietnamese workers were 
given the right to strike for the first time since the formation of 
the Vietnamese Republic.  To support this initiative, those 
involved in drafting referred to Ho Chi Minh in Decree No 29 of 
1947 that supported the right to strike under market 
conditions. Though in the past, strikes were not specifically 
outlawed, they were officially considered unnecessary as the 
enterprise belonged to the workers. In Vietnamese law, the 
tendency is to state what can be rather than what cannot be 
done. 
The legislated right to strike conforms to the International 
Convention of Labour, though some analysts are critical of the 
restrictions imposed on workers right to strike especially in the 
state sector. Although workers have the right to strike, they 
must give two weeks' notice prior to any industrial action to 
allow time for mediation. Furthermore, the right to strike will be 
rescinded in situations where a strike may hinder essential 
businesses and badly affect public life, national security and 
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defence, including health care, public transport and water and 
power supply. As well, public servants, the military and the 
police are unable to take strike action. Furthermore, the 
International Convention on Labour gives the right to freedom 
of association but in Vietnam this freedom is theoretical as 
there is only one trade union association. 
Other issues formalized by the code included an expanded 
social security system, legislated collective bargaining in the 
work place, introduction of an autonomous legal arbitration 
system which will operate outside the main judicial system, 
introduction minimum health and safety conditions, 
introduction of a minimum wage and overtime payments 
(overtime payments to be at 150 per cent, Sunday and holidays 
at 200 per cent and night shift, 30 per cent), a minimum 
working age and provide special provisions for women and 
juvenile labourers (flexible working hours, maternity packages 
and part-time work). 
The revisions made in the code of women's rights came 
under intense debate (Labour Code of Vietnam, 1994 Chapter 
10) .  In fact, some conditions for women deteriorated as a result 
of the new code. Paid maternity leave, for example, was 
reduced from six months to six to four months. Some textile 
factories who employ mainly women such as Minh Khai Textile 
Factory have attempted to deal with these constraints by 
drawing up schedules planning when each female worker is 
allowed to take maternity leave, leaving the women to plan 
their pregnancies, according to Do Nang Khanh from the 
research department of the Women's Union (Vie t n a m 
Investment Review, 30 June-6 July 1994) . The draft Labour Code 
included a provision for 30 minutes off everyday when a 
woman was menstruating and 60 minutes when they were 
breast-feeding. 
Implementation of the code is scheduled for 1 January 1995 
but it is likely that the necessary decrees for implementation 
will not be in place by then. Implementation requires 
procedures to be documented in the form of decrees which 
should be formally adopted by the government. This is both a 
time-consuming and expensive process. In December 1994 only 
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half of the expected twenty decrees had been drafted and the 
government would not consider these before 1 January 1995. 
Implementation of the Labour Code - as with other legal 
reforms in Vietnam - will likely experience substantial delays 
not only due to the pressure on government to deal with the 
backlog of legislation but also due to the continuing tension 
among interest groups. In the case of the Labour Code this 
tension is most clearly seen between MOUSA and the VGCL 
ostensibly centred on the ambition of MOUSA to create a 
unified social welfare system by taking over part of the role of 
the trade unions. But underpinning the tension is the reluctance 
of the VGCL to return control to MOUSA of valuable real 
estate in the form of holiday houses formerly used during 
vacations by workers at state-owned enterprises. 
Conclusion 
Vietnam is undergoing a process of fundamental change in 
labour relations: this involves a change in perspective from 
worker-run units to employer-employee relations in which 
interests are in opposition. These new labour relations strike at 
the heart of the socialist economy and their - successful 
management is one of the greatest challenges for the Vietnamese 
government. 
The new Labour Code is an attempt by government to 
create a new image of labour relations which is appropriate for 
market conditions. Although formal implementation of the code 
will be undoubtedly delayed, both employers and workers are 
expected to progressively use the code to regularize their 
relationships. 

Chapter 4 
Economy and the Environment 
Melanie Beresford * 
Introduction 
The achievement of 'sustainable development' is being 
increasingly discussed in Vietnam. In the last few years, we 
have seen a number of measures taken such as the 
establishment of environmental protection (EP) agencies in 
provinces; new investment projects may be required to include 
environmental impact assessments (EIAs) (though this is still at 
the discretion of the government and may be ignored if other 
objectives are considered more important); incorporation of 
environmental protection into the list of desirable attributes of 
foreign technology imports and investments; and the adoption 
by the Council of Ministers, in June 1991, of the National Plan 
for Environment and Sustainable Development 1991-2000 
(NPESD 1991). Moreover, interest in research on environmental 
issues has widened from the strong focus on the deforestation 
issue and questions of sustainable agricultural development 
which preoccupied earlier writers (see Beresford and Fraser 
1992; CRUNREP 1985), to the so-called 'brown' issues like 
industrial pollution and urban environment. This does not 
exactly amount to a flood of activity; far too little analysis has 
been done, particularly on the pol i t ica l economy of 
environmental issues in Vietnam. However, since 1990, when 
Lyn Fraser and I were writing our earlier article, the level of 
* Thanks are due to Nguyen Duy Truong for research assistance and 
to the Australian Research Council for providing financial support. 
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research and environmental activism has increased 
substantially. Just as in other countries, where environmental 
issues have become part of the economic agenda due to rising 
public pressure, this augurs well for improvements in the ability 
of Vietnamese institutions to handle environmental issues in the 
future. 
There is also increasing recognition among the major 
development agencies (World Bank 1993) that environmental 
damage can become a significant constraint on growth and 
development, not only through the overuse and destruction of 
natural resources, but through the potential for social instability 
which arises when populations are negatively affected by the 
impact of rapid ecological changes (as occurs, for example, 
when logging companies destroy forest resources upon which 
ethnic minorities depend for a living, or when hydropower 
construction alters the availability and fertility of surrounding 
agricultural land).  The impact of economic change on the 
environment, therefore, has become an important aspect of 
research and policy on economic development. 
My aim in this chapter is not to provide a survey of 
environmental problems facing Vietnam today - in any case 
this is a job that would be better done by a non-economist -
but to discuss some of the political economy issues relevant to 
achieving improvements in environmental management. This 
includes the issue of institutional change under the impact of 
economic renovation, or doi moi: what kind of avenues exist for 
the expression of environmental concerns, how are conflicts of 
interest over environmental issues resolved and what sort of 
social organization exists to deal with environmental 
problems? 
Environment in a transitional economic system 
It is appropriate to begin with a brief discussion of the 
'centrally planned' economy in Vietnam as it functioned prior 
to doi moi. This system has by no means been swept away in 
the past decade and, although important elements of a new 
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type of economic system are already in place, the influence of 
more traditional institutional arrangements is still felt. 
A succinct summary of the high environmental cost of 
economic growth in the former 'socialist' economic systems is 
given by W. Brus and K. Laski, both of whom were deeply 
involved in the effort to make central planning work in Poland. 
They make the point that, while the plans succeeded in getting 
rid of some of the irrationalities of the capitalist economic 
systems (chiefly lack of effective demand and unemployment), 
[The] plans singularly and consistently failed in respect 
of the cost of growth . . . .  The intensity of inputs (labour, 
material and capital) in relation to output in countries of 
'real socialism' was substantially higher not only in the 
leading industrial countries but also those countries at a 
similar level of economic development. This is especially 
true of the degree of material intensity (use of energy, 
steel, cement, and so on in relation to national income) 
and of the dynamic of capital intensity in the process of 
growth. The Soviet rate of change of capital productivity 
was negative over the entire half-century . . . .  [The 
system's] high-cost characteristics also had wide-ranging 
negative consequences for environmental issues, which 
were supposed to be singularly cared for under 
socialism in view of its expected capacity to 'internalize 
externalities' . . . .  In actual fact, the arbitrary power to 
impose narrowly selected objectives, and to disregard 
long-term implications if they were seen as interfering 
with the chosen aims, has led in many cases to damage 
to the environment in countries of 'real socialism' on a 
scale a lmost unknown nowadays in developed 
capitalist countries (Brus and Laski 1989:29-30) 
Various experiments in combining plan and market, mainly 
focussed on overcoming the problem caused by high rates of 
output growth without rising living standards, were tried out in 
Eastern Europe. But Hungary and Yugoslavia were the only 
countries where it proved politically possible to modify the 
centralized economic mechanism over any length of time. Yet, 
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as Brus and Laski point out, even the innovative Hungarian 
New Economic Mechanism suffered from the problem of what 
they term 'overriding policy objectives inimical to market 
coordination' . 
Under this enigmatic formula many different things may 
hide, including the goal of preservation of the monopoly 
of political power by the ruling communist elite, or the 
goal of safeguarding the well-known and deeply 
entrenched vested interests of the bureaucracy . . . .  
However, under this heading we may also put noble, 
socially desirable policy objectives aiming at raising the 
level of welfare of the society, defined in a 
comprehensible and widely accepted way. This is the 
foundation of the concept used by Kornai in the last 
chapter of his Economics of Shortage -- paternalism, 
which as a matter of principle props up a family 
member in difficulties (ibid. : 70) . 
In practice this means that even under reformed socialism in 
which enterprise directors and others are supposed to respond 
to market signals, there are many elements which ensure that 
they do not. Enterprise directors in Vietnam still receive 
conflicting signals to a certain extent. On the one hand, they are 
supposed to be financially autonomous and make their own 
pricing and output decisions; on the other hand, they are still 
subject to a considerable degree of interference by the 
bureaucracy. Some of them still have to meet export orders at 
'friendship prices' (e.g. for trade with Cuba); there are informal 
quotas and licences; there is monitoring of prices, the burden of 
profit taxes seems to be partly a matter for negotiation with 
higher levels (since profits themselves are not clearly defined); 
and there is rationing of credit according to criteria imposed 
from above instead of commercial considerations. Moreover, 
despite the passage of the much-vaunted bankruptcy law, it 
has not yet been applied to the state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
sector. Basically then, many SOEs still face 'soft budget 
constraints' which means that the pressure on them to perform, 
although greatly increased compared with the past, is not yet 
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fundamental to their operations. Faced with a choice between 
operating according to market criteria and the wishes of 
administrative bosses, most enterprises would choose the 
latter. 'There is less reliance on the force of competition in 
preference to direct intervention from above' (ibid. : 69) .  
The implications of  this lack of competitive pressure are 
that enterprises do not generally experience incentives to 
innovate. One of the chief benefits of a market economy is 
supposed to be the competitive pressure to reduce costs, 
increase profitability, improve diversity and quality of 
products in order to increase market share. In principle, 
competition ought to increase the rate of innovations which 
reduce wasteful use of raw material and energy. However, we 
know from capitalist experience that technical 'progress' is far 
from automatically environment-friendly. The existence of 
externalities, in which private costs and benefits are socialized, 
is precisely what has led to calls for state intervention to force 
polluting industries and their customers to bear the true costs 
of their activities . In theory, the imposition of taxes or other 
penalties on polluters should encourage them to innovate in 
ways which reduce pollution. 
In practice, competition between SOEs, between state and 
private sectors and between local and foreign producers is 
generally discouraged in Vietnam. 1 Despite decentralization of 
decision-making, the level of public monopoly in the industrial 
sector has not been reduced significantly. The local private 
sector, in particular, still suffers from discriminatory practices 
which deprive it of access to capital and foreign exchange. The 
foreign private sector is treated somewhat differently, but 
despite a foreign investment law which allows 100 per cent 
ownership, most foreign companies go into partnership with 
local SOE producers rather than enter into direct competition 
with them. Although these joint ventures may lead to 
technology transfer (including skills transfer), competitive 
1 For similar concerns expressed about reform in China see the 
comments by Wu Jinglian quoted in BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, Part 3, Far East, FE/ 1524, B2/3, 29 October 1992. 
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pressures are only likely to be felt in the export-oriented ones. 
Despite periodic prohibitions on imports, some foreign 
competition also exists from smuggled goods in the domestic 
market. 
Despite imperfections, some spur to improve productivity 
and output quality may result from competing with imported 
goods and through the various incentives to increase exports . 
The intention of the government, however, would appear to be 
to protect the state industrial sector from competition as much 
as possible during the transition period . This is particularly 
evident in relation to potential competition between domestic 
state-owned producers. In practice, many of them have been 
deliberately formed into cartels like the Vietnam National Steel 
Corp, which includes all the country's steel producers, in which 
the various state enterprises exchange information about 
technology, fix prices, etc.  Many enterprise directors express 
views about competition which sound more like the old 
'socialist emulation' than capitalist 'survival of the fittest' . 2  
Transition to a market economy in Vietnam has therefore 
been accompanied by both formal and informal pressures to 
maintain monopoly power within the state-owned industrial 
sector . Administrative interference has often been used to shore 
up monopoly and establish barriers to entry by new firms. The 
result is what one writer has referred to as the emergence of a 
'state business interest' in which supposedly autonomous SOEs 
and their line ministries derive mutual benefit from continued 
indirect subsidies and protection of markets (Fforde 1993:310) . 
Under these circumstances, the expec ted benefits of  
competition are unlikely to  materialize and indeed the 'state 
business interest' may form a serious obstacle in the medium­
term to market-driven innovation. 
These observations are supported by the little empirical 
evidence that is  available on the rate of innovation in 
Vietnamese enterprises .  According to one source (Do Hoai 
Nam 1994:334), only 18 per cent of SOEs have 'made 
2 See Beresford (1993) for further discussion of attitudes among 
state enterprise directors. 
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investments in new technologies after the year 1986' .  My own 
research on a mixture of state and collective enterprises in the 
northern region during 1992 showed a very strong correlation 
between date of establishment of the enterprise and age of 
equipment. In enterprises established before 1985, an average 
of 3 to 12 per cent of equipment had been introduced since that 
date, while over 40 per cent of the equipment dated from 
before 1965 (Beresford 1992) .3 Industrial output increases are 
therefore being achieved on the basis of increased use of old 
capacity. Moreover, even where new capacity is introduced, the 
chiefly anecdotal evidence is mixed as to whether pollution­
control measures are being added. 
While the situation is changing, then, the shift towards the 
market mechanism has not yet produced a major shift towards 
innovation in the enterprise sector. And since the shift to 
innovation is itself very small, it is too soon to say whether the 
future trend will be towards pollution reducing measures . 
Innovation is a necessary condition for reduction of the 
environmental damage caused by industry, but whether it 
achieves this objective will not depend on ingenuity per se, but 
on the capacity of the state to compel pollution-minimizing 
changes. Because the state is the arena in which the power of 
certain social groups to affect change is expressed, the 
development of a capacity to achieve better environmental 
controls will largely depend on the new concentrations of 
power emerging in the market economy and the institutional 
forms to which they give rise. It is to this issue that I now turn. 
The politics of environmental economics 
The definition of what is pollution and what is a resources is 
essentially cultural (Rawlings 1994:4); and what is a resource 
.3 A total of 41 state and collective enterprises provided data on 
the age of their machinery stock. In nineteen pre-1965 enterprises, 
the average proportion of new machines was 12 per cent; in ten 
enterprises established in 1965-74, 3 per cent; in three enterprises 
established from 1975-84, 3 per cent. 
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for one group of people may be pollution for another. Conflict 
between different cultural systems are the heart of the problem 
of sustainability. Examples of this abound : the culture of 
shifting cultivators versus that of the lowlanders who are 
increasingly settling in the highland regions; the culture of heavy 
industrial producers in the state-business sector versus the 
tourist industry and local residents in Quang Ninh (Bach Tan 
Sinh 1994); the culture of local farming communities versus 
discharges of waste water in Hanoi (Rawlings 1994) . 
Economics tries to ignore the cultural dimensions of the 
problem and reduce it to a question of costs and benefits which 
are measurable, not only in principle, but in practice. 
The stumbling block for cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the 
existence of externalities which often have a non-economic 
character. A typical example of how this problem with cost­
benefit analysis is usually ignored or underrated can be found 
in a recent analysis by Mohan Munasinge, chief of the World 
Bank's Environmental Economics Division: 
Unfortunately, externalities are often difficult to 
measure in physical and monetary terms. [An] example 
is open-access resources - typically assets usable by all 
without payment, such as a lake or public highway -
which are difficult to value and tend to be overexploited 
since user charges are negligible. 
What can be done? The value of an externality can be 
assessed, based on its shadow price or economic 
opportunity cost, and a charge imposed. But if this is 
not possible, policymakers can impose regulations and 
standards that set physical limits on perceived external 
damages, or better define property rights - thereby 
encouraging improved natural resource management 
(Munasinge 1993:17). 
The quote exemplifies current World Bank thinking in 
favour of 'bringing the state back in' that has been a result of 
the East Asian experience of growth. But there is little 
recognition here or in other World Bank analyses of the implicit 
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biases in such thinking or, what amounts to the same thing, the 
essentially political nature of the decisions to impose 
regulations, set limits or define property rights. Recognizing the 
political nature of these decisions involves opening up the 
whole hornets ' nest of who in a given society holds political 
power and in whose interest they tend to wield it. The bank's 
environmental department does in fact recognize the 
importance of information, institutional arrangements and local 
people's  participation in environmental rehabilitation programs 
(Steer 1993 :21) ,  but it has to work with existing state 
apparatuses and, moreover, has historically strongly supported 
institutional arrangements favouring capitalist development. In 
Southeast Asia generally, the existing state structures do not 
tend to favour democratic controls (viz . the numerous 
examples of reafforestation programs favouring commercial 
interests in Thailand [Apichai et al. 1992]) and this has never 
provided the World Bank with any level of discomfort. 
Some of the difficulties with CBA can be illustrated using 
the example of Thanh Tri district and Hanoi 's  waste water 
(Rawlings 1994) .4 Here the economic beneficiaries are Hanoi 
polluters who have free waste water discharge and the farmers 
in northern part of Thanh Tri district who use nutrient rich 
waste water to boost crop and fish production . External 
diseconomies are: for the Hanoi residents, increasing incidence 
of flooding and toxicity in some areas; for Tranh Tri residents, 
relatively high incidence of infections (ENT, genital, etc.)  and 
(possibly, though the link is not yet established) below average­
size of children in a relatively wealthy district on account of 
frequent serious flooding in the area. Cost-benefit analysis says 
that the benefits to Thanh Tri farmers outweigh the costs. 
Farmers' costs are measured in terms of cost of medical 
treatment, which is low because the infections are mostly self-
4 Thanh Tri is the district immediately to the south of Hanoi city 
which, due to the system of natural drainage, is the ultimate 
recipient of Hanoi's waste water. 
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treated,s and the cost of drilling bores for drinking water (the 
bore water is high in ammonia at 27 mg/litre (Nguyen Thanh 
Binh and Pham Manh Chinh 1994:144, 211)  which may add to 
the diseconomies) . On the basis of this assessment, Rawlings 
(1994) recommends solutions to the diseconomies should be 
based on the existing system; i .e.  it should leave the benefits 
intact. This means continuing to utilize the natural drainage 
system of the city, stopping toxic pollution at p oint of 
discharge and creating a wetland buffer zone which would 
naturally purify the waste water, so eliminating the infection 
problem. The problems raised by flooding the polluted bore 
water are not explicitly dealt with in this solution. 
The CBA also does not look at dynamics . The population 
and economic activities of Hanoi are growing, thereby 
increasing not only waste water discharge but also the level of 
toxic substances in that water. At the same time, houses are 
being built, in an uncontrolled way, where lakes used to be, so 
the natural drainage system has a decreasing capacity to 
handle the waste water discharge. Industrial development in 
the city is also largely unregulated, especially with regard to the 
growth of the small scale private sector. The SOE sector is also 
expanding, still using old technology, while new investment is 
not necessarily going into upgrading the old technology or into 
environmentally 'clean' technology. The city has a declining 
proportion of organic waste. In practical terms, how can the 
city control pollution at source? If we have problems with 
illegal dumping of toxic chemicals in a well-regulated city like 
Sydney, what can we expect from a city like Hanoi which has 
5 A question not dealt with in Rawlings' paper is whether the 
individuals who suffer from the infections are the same household 
members who derive income from the activities which utilize waste 
water. The methodology of the household survey is not disclosed, 
but the reference to vaginal infections (Rawlings 1994:6) gives 
indirect evidence that the direct bearers of the cost are in fact not 
always the same as the 'household' recipient of income. The 
presumed ability to aggregate individual utility functions to arrive 
at a 'household' or even a 'social' utility maximization position, 
which is at the basis of CBA, is brought into question here. 
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few resources, problems with corruption, thousands o f  
unregistered economic activities and a population whose 
environmental  awareness is, despite quite high levels of 
education, very much conditioned by short-term economic 
benefits? Despite the enormous cost of waste treatment plants, 
the 'end of pipe' solution may be the only viable one because 
the problem is centralized in a location where it can be dealt 
with by relatively few people and a large amount of equipment. 
As Rawlings says, 'policy "borrowed" from post industrial 
societies with vastly different political cultures, legislative 
frameworks and infrastructure development will prove to be 
inappropriate for Vietnam' (Rawlings 1994: 12) . 
To what extent do 'ecologically sound' waste treatment 
systems depend on having a well-organized (i .e .  a relatively 
highly developed) society? The Vietnamese were quite famous, 
in the days of the cooperative system for some of their 
ecologically sound agricultural practices - the use of organic 
fertilizer, the development of the V AC system of farming, the 
primary health care campaigns in the countryside.6 These have 
been rightly praised for the results they achieved within the 
context of a war-torn country with a very low per capita GDP. 
Their success, however, relied upon high levels of mass 
mobilization, often overriding individual preferences. The 
dismantling of the cooperative system of agricultural 
production and the new emphasis on individual incentives has 
seen the parallel collapse of many of these programs. 
Nowadays, instead of having an underdeveloped planned 
economy, Vietnam has an underdeveloped market economy - I 
am using the term 'underdeveloped' to mean not only low 
income levels, but also low levels of institutional development.7 
6 VAC refers to the combination of gardening, animal husbandry, 
and water-fowl and fish raising. 
7 Another example is provided by a recent oil tanker collision 
which resulted in the spilling of thousands of tonnes of oil into the 
Saigon river. Thoi Bao Kinh Te Vie t Nam ( 1 9 9 4 [ 3 4 ] [ 2 5 - 3 1  
August] : l l )  pointed out that, according to some sources, with the 
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As remarked by a leading Vietnamese personality commenting 
on the question of the level of actual regulation of the economy 
in Vietnam: 'What we do here is much less than in the US, but 
they [the Vietnamese Communists] think that because they are 
socialists they do a lot more' . 
If Vietnam's market institutions (including regulatory 
institutions) are underdeveloped, how is it going to achieve the 
level of social organization necessary to provide 'state-of-the­
art' environmental controls? 
On the basis of the admittedly limited evidence available 
about the Hanoi waste water problem, I would like to propose 
two general hypotheses. One is that cost-benefit analyses are 
necessarily value-laden. They are biased towards utilizing the 
costs which can be easily measured in terms of market prices. 
Moreover, they assume the possibility of aggregating individual 
preferences in a way which is impossible where conflicts of 
interest occur or where the decisions of one individual are 
contingent upon those of another. Thus the position that the 
present and future benefits to (some) Thanh Tri farmers and 
Hanoi citizens of current waste water usage practices, based on 
their market-place decisions, are unambiguously higher than the 
social costs is not supported. In fact it is a culturally relativist 
position. Conflicts of interest are inevitable, which is basically 
why we do have states to impose solutions to these conflicts. 
The state, however, cannot represent the interests of 
everybody. Whose interests does it represent? 
The second hypothesis concerns the appropriateness of 
technology. The concept 'technology' does not merely involve 
lump s  of equipment, but depends crucially on social 
organization. What seems like a good 'clean' technology in the 
West, where it has emerged within rather highly developed 
institutional frameworks, may be impossible to apply 
successfully in Vietnam. Under the 'socialist' system, those 
'clean' technologies that were applied depended on high levels 
of mobilization by the party and mass organizations. At the 
currently available educational facilities it would take twenty 
years to provide adequate training for all Vietnamese river pilots. 
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same time, organization of the state-run industrial sector was 
based on the principle that 'nature' could be treated as a free 
resource (Beresford and Fraser 1992:  1 1 ; de Bardeleben 
1985:241 ) .  The dominant institutional cultures of the 
Vietnamese market economy are still emerging and it remains 
very hard to say how they will define concepts like 'pollution' 
and 'resource' .  8 
Environmental protection has received some attention in the 
reorganization of the Vietnamese state apparatus which has 
accompanied the process of reform. Within the State Planning 
Committee (SPC ), which holds responsibility for preparing 
national  pl ans and determining external as sis tance 
requirements, an environmental unit has been established as 
part of  the Department of Science and Education . An 
independent committee, with cross-ministerial membership has 
also been established to vet foreign investment proposals for 
their technological and environmental impact on Vietnam and 
the reports of this committee are supposed to be taken into 
account by the SPC in formulating its plans. There is also a 
National Environment Agency within the Ministry for Science, 
Technology and the Environment (MOSTE), while at the 
provincial and city levels there are committees for Science, 
Technology and the Environment (COSTE} responsible to the 
local people ' s  c ommittees . Temp orary guidelines for 
environmental impact statements have also been developed, 
but not yet incorporated into formal regulations . While Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City have developed regulations for control 
of such things as air and water pollution as well as waste 
disposal, there are no nationwide criteria established and there 
remain many problems with implementation. Provinces are 
allowed to set their own standards, but most seem to be 
waiting for central guidance before taking any steps 
(GoV / UNDP 1994: 1 1 ) .  
8 Although some people have made up their minds: viz. the bland 
optimism of those commentators who talk about the 'normalisation' 
of the Vietnamese economy versus the pessimistic outlook of a 
commentator like Gerard Greenfield (1994). 
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An institutional framework for environmental protection is 
therefore in the process of creation. In fact a list  of 
environmental institutions compiled by the National Research 
Program on Environment contains 163 organizations under four 
categories. These are: 
• Environmental management: 26 (including 18 at the central 
government level, 5 local government, 3 central offices at 
local level); 
• Environment control and planning: 17 (11 central, 4 local, 2 
offices); 
• Education, training and research : 75 (32 central, 5 people 's  
committees, 13 national scientific centres, 24 universities, 
1 non-government organization [NGO] ); 
• Research, informat ion ,  consul tancy :  56 (24 central, 1 
people 's committee, 30 national scientific centres, 1 
provincial medical centre) (ibid. : 13) .  
However, these organizations do not necessarily carry real 
political weight. The tendency to override environmental 
concerns in favour of other objectives is still prevalent in the 
actual decision making processes in Vietnam. Moreover, there is 
scarcely any evidence from recent political developments 
within the Communist Party that environmental protection is 
yet on the agenda at the highest levels. Party Secretary General 
Do Muoi, in delivering the political report to the Mid Term 
National Conference of the party held in January 1994, 
enumerated four basic challenges facing the country today: 
The challenges lie in: the danger of our economy falling 
further behind those of other countries in the region and 
the world due to our low starting point, our still low 
unstable growth rate and the fact that we have to 
develop in an environment of tough competition; the 
possibility of our going astray from the socialist 
orientation if we fail to correct deviations from the path 
laid down for its implementation; corruption and other 
social evils; "peaceful evolution" schemes and activities 
undertaken by hostile forces (CPV 1994:24) .  
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Among the 'social evils' which are discussed elsewhere in 
the report, environmental damage does not rate any discussion, 
although some lip service is paid to a list of factors such as 
'research and development in science and technology, 
education and training, health care and environmental 
protection, in order to meet development needs in the short and 
long term' ( ibid . :28) . But this is basically a motherhood 
statement and the environment receives no further attention. In 
fact the whole tone of the report is to stress economic growth 
and efficiency in production. The 'abundance' of Vietnam's 
natural resources is several times noted in an unproblematic 
way. 
In the practical field, there are numerous pieces of evidence 
that the Vietnamese state, or at least some of its various 
branches, is prepared to adopt solutions to environmental 
problems which favour those with market power. We can cite, 
for example, the recent construction of golf courses in 
supposedly protected forest areas and national parks (Hiebert 
1993c:58) while sport and recreational facilities for the bulk of 
the population are almost completely lacking; Hanoi city's 
overriding its own height limits on buildings around Hoan Kiem 
lake in favour of a Hong Kong developer; the adoption of user­
pays principle in a recent contract for a water purification 
plant in Ho Chi Minh City which will result in the city buying 
water from the foreign investor at US$0.20 per cubic metre 
(Indochina Digest 1994[33]), equivalent to an annual per capita 
charge of US$1 1-15 per annum.9 Unless the city plans to 
subsidize the distribution of clean water, it seems that even this 
is likely to become a preserve of the well off. 
The Foreign Investment Law of Vietnam promulgated in late 
1987 specified environmental protection as one of the key areas 
in which foreign investment would be encouraged. However, a 
number of critics have suggested that the State Committee on 
Cooperation and Investment, which is charged with approving 
foreign investment projects is 'only interested in issuing 
9 Based on an estimated demand of 150-200m3 per day (Thoi Bao 
Kinh Te Viet Nam 1994[33] [18-24 August] :l5). 
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licences' and actually pays little or no attention to the social 
and environmental impact of foreign investment activity. There 
is also a specialist national-level committee which examines the 
potential social and environmental impacts of imported 
technologies and reports to the State Planning Committee prior 
to investment projects receiving approval . 1 0 However, its 
recommendations can be easily overridden if other objectives 
are seen to be more important by the SPC. 
Within the SOE sector, there are mixed signals .  The 
government can still, post-doi moi, make essentially political 
decisions like the one to build a transmission line from north to 
south. This has led to renewed power shortages in the north of 
the country, on the one hand forcing villages in the region 
around the Hoa Binh power station to buy small Chinese 
generators (Indochina Digest 1994[15]) and, on the other hand, 
provoking a discussion about reopening the Pha Lai thermal 
power station in Quang Ninh province, which was earlier 
closed on account of its highly polluting character. Other, 
similar, power stations are still in production (like the one in 
Ninh Binh town) . In the Viet Tri industrial area (Vinh Phu 
province) fossil fuel emissions were recently reported to be 
from 20 to 120 times the legal limit (Thai Bao Kinh Te Viet Nam 
1994[34] [25-31 August] :5) .  While Vietnam still has one of the 
lowest rates of forest depletion in the Southeast Asian region 
and a comparatively high rate of reafforestation (Hirsch 
1993:53), the government's efforts to preserve the country's  
forest cover are not without some irony. Domestic wood­
product manufacturers were recently asked to import timber 
from neighbouring countries in order to help preserve Vietnam's 
own forests (Indochina Digest 1994[22 ]) .  
One of the major causes of pollution and bad health among 
workers is the widespread and unregulated private small-scale 
mining activity. This is another case of the free market activity 
being anti-environment. The only major attempt to control it so 
10 According to Chinese specialists at a recent roundtable conference 
on Science and Technology Policy in Hanoi (September 1994), no such 
national-level body exists in China. 
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far has been a classic case of administrative intervention. The 
government announced recently that all coal operations in 
Quang Ninh would be compelled to join a new national Coal 
Corporation, comprising the existing state-owned companies, a 
new army coal company, and a new provincial coal company. 
All other enterprises are required to cease operations and 
dissolve immediately (Thai Bao Kinh Te Viet Nam 1994[33] [ 18-
24 August] :2) . In the absence of complementary measures to 
improve employment opportunities and incomes, the measure 
seems hardly likely to succeed. 
On the other hand, I do not want to be overly pessimistic 
about this. There are some signs in Vietnam, for example in a 
spate of recent newspaper articles in Nhan Dan and Ha Noi 
Mai, that pressures are arising for more effective monitoring 
and enforcement of environmental protection provisions. 
Moreover Vietnam has a strong history of scientific research, 
including on environmental issues (State Science and 
Technology Committee 1982; Nguyen Due Ngu et al. 1991 ) .  
These need to be supported by both formal organizational set­
ups and, most importantly public awareness and means of 
expression for public interests. In Vietnam at the present time, 
despite the existence of a number of EP authorities, public 
awareness is low, except in areas where, for example, pollution 
directly impinges on people's living conditions as in the case of 
the coal-washing plant in Hon Gai (Bach Tan Sinh 1994) . And 
in such cases, public activity is on an ad hoe basis. The type of 
coalition which formed to fight the coal-washing plant may 
easily dissolve once the particular issue is resolved. 
The example of the coal-washing plant can also be used to 
make another important point about the politics of  
environmental protection in Vietnam. In this case, a petition of 
some 14,000 signatures was initiated by local residents to 
prevent the establishment of a new coal-washing plant 
(belonging to the Ministry of Energy's Hon Gai Coal Company) 
in the centre of Hon Gai town on the site where the French 
Societe des Charbonnages du Tonkin had built its original 
plant. The workers argued that they had enough pollution in 
their daily working lives without having it at home too. The 
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local authorities strongly supported their case and the prime 
minister was compelled to visit the town in order to help 
resolve the dispute. Eventually the plant, already under 
construction at the original site, had to be moved to a new 
location outside the town (ibid . ) .  The consequences of not 
having a wide public discussion on environmental issues before 
a new project is initiated are well illustrated by this case . In 
fact the new coal-washing plant was to be a 'state-of-the-art' 
clean technology. Although an environmental impact statement 
was prepared, it was submitted only to the Ministry of Energy, 
not to the local authority's COSTE and, of course, the worker­
residents did not see it at all . There were clear potential 
conflicts among the three parties involved: the workers were 
concerned to protect their residential environment, the local 
government had an interest in the development of the tourist 
industry in the area, and the coal company wanted to take 
advantage of economies associated with having the coal­
washing plant close to the port. Since the residents and local 
authorities were given no opportunity to monitor the project 
during the early stages of development, these potential conflicts 
turned in to open conflict. 
Institutionalized means of expression are still scarce and, 
as Rawlings (1994:9) points out, mainly based on the urban, 
educated elite rather than on working class or peasant 
organization. Examples include a recently formed NGO, the 
Institute of Ecological Economics (Vien Kinh Te Thai Sinh) , 
Hanoi University's Centre for Research on Environment Studies 
(CRES) and the Environment Centre at the Institute for Science 
Management. In the absence of organized public pressure for 
EP - for example through elected representatives, NGO 
activities, mass organizations of peasants, workers, etc. - the 
existing bureaucratic structures are unlikely to be effective. On 
the one hand they will not have the resources (material, 
information and labour) to form an effective countervailing 
force to key industrial polluters like the Ministry of Energy. On 
the other hand the EP institutions themselves may become the 
instruments of sectional interests. For example, in the Hon Gai 
case the local authorities, who supported the workers' protests, 
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may have been more interested in the future of the Ha Long Bay 
tourism industry which, unlike coal mining and processing, is 
under their own control. It does not always follow that local 
government will be more sensitive to environmental issues than 
central government. 
So far, we have little evidence to suggest the growth of grass 
roots social organizations to counteract the destructive 
influence of the traditional 'socialist' model of treating natural 
resources and the environment as 'free goods'. Existing NGOs 
(or 'QUANGOs' 1 1 ), while capable of achieving significant 
benefits, will need to build a capacity for wider social 
organization in the longer term. 1 2 There is evidence of ad hoe 
popular organization (the Hon Gai protest and the 
unsuccessful protests against the construction of the Thu Due 
golf course in supposedly protected national forest (Hiebert 
1993c:58), but it is too early to say whether these can develop 
into sustained programs of environmental awareness. On the 
other hand, there is also evidence of activity by the Vietnam 
General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) in the area of 
occupational health and safety in the coal mining region. If the 
experience of other Southeast Asian countries is anything to go 
by, the development of stronger ties between the urban-based 
organizations and popular struggles and continued 
development of public pressure on the quasi-state 
organizations (like the VGCL, Peasants' Association, etc.) and 
other government instrumentalities are essential preconditions 
for more consistent improvement in environmental conditions. 
l l Quasi-non-government organizations. 
1 2 An example given to me recently was an irrigation scheme 
organized by members of the Institute of Science Management's 
Environment Centre in an area of resettlement of households 
displaced by the Da River dam. The project was initially organized 
by the ISM, paid for by the Australian ambassador, and designed 
and implemented by the villagers themselves. 
88 Beresford 
Conclusion 
If the definition of what is a resource and what constitutes 
pollution are essentially questions of culture, then questions of 
how resources are exploited become questions of conflict of 
interest between different cultures within given systems of 
social relations . We have seen that under 'actually existing 
socialism' in Vietnam and other countries before the late 1980s, 
relations of power ensured that resource exploitation served 
the ends of centrally planned industrialization, as well as the 
creation of a welfare system, with little regard for the social 
costs . In the process of making the transition to a market 
economy, elements of the earlier system are still very visible 
and there seems to have been little let up in the rate of 
environmental damage. 
Some solutions to environmental problems may emerge in 
Vietnam in a 'top down' way, especially as problems like lack 
of clean water supply are seen to be a hindrance to 
productivity and/ or a disincentive to foreign investors . But in 
the long run, sustained pressure for improvements in the 
environment will come from organization at grassroots levels 
which elevates the political costs of continuing environmental 
destruction to unacceptable levels. There are some signs that 
this sort of public pressure is starting to emerge in Vietnam 
and, given that the Vietnamese state has shown itself to be 
more sensitive to popular discontent than some other regional 
governments, this is a hopeful sign for the future. 
Chapter 5 
Recent Developments in the 
Commercial Legal System 
John Gillespie 
Background 
The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) recently indicated 
that economic development is Vietnam's most urgent national 
goal . Unless Vietnam can rapidly increase its industrial and 
technological base, party leaders fear the economy will fall 
further behind those of its neighbours (Central Committee 1994; 
Le Phuoc Tho 1994:3) . Foreign and domestic investment are 
key elements of this development strategy (Cao Duy Ha 
1994:7), but they are impeded by Vietnam's legal system. The 
need for law reform is now well accepted and focuses on three 
areas: (a) the legislative mechanism, (b) enactment of a body of 
commercial law and (c) dispute resolution and enforcement.1 
This chapter is primarily concerned with laws regarding 
structural reform of the domestic market; the foreign investment 
regime is already well reported (Furniss 1994:238; Taylor 
1994:469) .  
Law reform in Vietnam is  preoccupied with two legal 
models, often discussed as if they were irreconcilable. The first 
is a rational rights-based legal structure, often assumed to be 
the only one that provides the degree of systematization 
required for a modern industrial state. Property and 
contractual rights are considered to be of primary importance; 
they must be defined by objective rules of law and protected by 
1 See Appendix for a summary of recently promulgated legislation. 
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an independent judiciary. Not surprisingly, this 'rule of law' 
model is familiar to and advocated by Western legal 
commentators since it underlies the market economies in most 
industrialized countries (Lichtenstein 1994: 1-2, 5, 43-44, 60-61; 
Hoang Phuoc Hiep and Bergling 1994: 37-38, 116) . 
The second is a socialist legal system, which the 
bureaucracy and judiciary in the Vietnam were trained to 
administer. Consequentially these administrative agencies often 
have neither an academic nor cultural understanding of the key 
concepts underpinning the right based legal model (Sidel 
1993:223-228) . Rather than mapping a public commercial 
space, legislation in the main reinforced the existing interlocking 
system of administrative licences that are a legacy of Vietnam's 
socialist legal system (Feinerman 1994:227-234) . Considerable 
effort is now being made to enact legislation that will form the 
basis of a law-governed society. Reforms have been hindered 
by poor legal drafting and overlapping ministerial 
responsibilities (Hoang The Lien 1994:33-36) . But even well­
drafted laws must eventually be implemented by 
administrators and judges who in the recent past have 
displayed little regard for market mechanisms. The dilemma 
facing law makers in Vietnam is whether land and other 
commercial transactions should continue to be almost 
exclusively regulated by the subjective authority of the 
bureaucracy or should a greater role be given to objective rules 
of law. 
There is broad agreement in Vietnam that the essentially 
Soviet legal structure already in place is no longer appropriate 
for the emerging 'mixed market' economy (Sidel 1994:173, 174) . 
In an attempt to make the legal system more compatible law 
makers have borrowed laws on an ad hoe basis, particularly 
from China. This practice is now being seriously questioned as 
it has been found that particularly laws derived from norm­
based legal systems cannot readily be adapted to suit 
Vietnamese political, economic and legal conditions. The more 
so as Vietnamese law makers and bureaucrats frequently do 
not pay sufficient regard to the role played by concepts such as 
natural rights, liberalism and the sharing of legal rights between 
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individuals and the state, that underpin rights based legal 
systems (Bottomley 1991 :  Chapter 2). 
Law makers are also re-examining the theoretical 
justification for law-based governance. Debate has polarized 
around two antagonistic principles, rule of law (Rechtss taat) 
and socialist legality (sometimes termed 'state legal rights') . 
Both theories insist on strict legal obedience, but the rule of law 
also requires a shift of law-making power from the 
administrative apparatus to democratic legislative assemblies 
(Dicey 1885:218; Jowell and Oliver 1984: Chapter 1) .2 In other 
words, in the rule of law model, the legal system is highly 
differentiated from the political process. Socialist legality, on 
the other hand, is primarily concerned with social compliance 
and does not differentiate between the sources of law, their 
form or content. A legal system without private commercial 
rights, entirely regulated by administrative licences, would not 
offend socialist legality, provided the bureaucracy and citizens 
strictly complied with all licensing conditions . This 
undifferentiated construction of the law-based society was 
recently endorsed by the Mid Term National Party Conference, 
20 January 1994 (Saigon Giai Phong, 19 March 1994:2). 
At the same time, although state institutions are still 
controlled by the party, the use of ad hoe party directives to 
govern society has been virtually abandoned. Constitutional 
reform now officially requires all organizations of the CPV to 
operate within the framework of the law (Constitution 1992, 
Art. 4) . According to this theoretical formula, policy is 
exclusively determined by the Communist Party, while state 
institutions transpose it into law, administer the legal system 
and resolve disputes. Superficially, Vietnamese law makers 
appear to be regularizing the socialist legal system through the 
introduction of governance by law. It will be argued, however, 
that this reform is limited to the legislative arm of the state and 
does not appear to affect the executive and judiciary. 
2 In the West the Diceyan view of the rule of law has given way 
to a comprehensive theory which includes a greater role for the 
s tate . 
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Legislative reform 
Structural changes 
Gi l le spie  
Law makers have identified structural inefficiencies within the 
law-making process as one of the major impediments to the 
development of a law-based society (Saigon Giai Phong 3 
August 1993:2 [Nguyen Van Thao] ) .  After the CPV 
relinquished its direct legislative role, no other state institution 
has gained sufficient authority to coordinate legislative 
development. The recent explosion of commercial regulations 
for example, rather than indicating good health, is a symptom 
of a lack of coordination between legislative bodies. Some argue 
that the National Assembly, as Vietnam's most democratic and 
supreme legislative institution, is well suited to perform this 
key 'filtering' function. Somewhat ambitiously, the Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) has attempted to maintain systematic drafting 
standards and avoid legislative duplication, but lacks the 
expertise and political power to influence line ministries . By 
mid 1994 this role had been assumed by the Office of 
Government. Success, however, is far from assured. 
The National Assembly stands at the apex of the legislative 
pyramid (Constitution 1992, Art. 84[1 ] ) .  This body sits for a 
relatively short period (two to four weeks) twice a year so its 
heavy work schedule may hamper systematic review of 
legislation (Do 1993:1 16, 117-120) . Such a review has to some 
extent been delegated to the Law Commission, which, with the 
assistance of the Law Committee, evaluates draft laws and 
sets the legislative agenda for the National Assembly. In the 
past, draft laws submitted by line ministries were adopted by 
National Assembly delegates with little debate.  Recently, 
however, the National Assembly has attempted to improve the 
quality of legislation, and as a consequence, the rejection rate 
for draft laws has noticeably increased. This newly acquired 
selectivity is not entirely a function of improved drafting 
standards. Politically assertive factional interests within the 
National Assembly reportedly block laws that might adversely 
affect their client base. The numerous redrafts, compromises 
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and delays plaguing the enactment of the Law on State 
Enterprises provides a case in point. 
Legislative renovation has not only improved the 
mechanical quality of drafting in Vietnam, but has also 
regularized the transformation of policy into law. All new laws 
must now be accompanied by a memorandum explaining the 
policy under administration and enforcement of substantive 
provisions. Ironically, factional disagreements within the 
National Assembly are routinely resolved through political 
compromises that reduce national law to little more than a 
framework of broad hortative principles. Policy intended to 
balance public and private rights is as a consequence often 
determined by the executive arm of the state creating a rapidly 
proliferating mass of uncoordinated subordinate legislation and 
quasi-legal administrative instruments such as ministerial 
circulars, people's committee decisions and business licences. In 
many ways the executive bodies continue to play the dominate 
legislative role they performed under the pre doi moi legal 
system (Hoang The Lien 1994:34). 
Coordination of the system would be vastly simplified by 
the enactment of a law that authoritatively defined the 
hierarchical status of legislative instruments and established a 
conflict of laws regime. The government, for example, not 
uncommonly passes subordinate legislation that purports to 
vary rights created by the constitutionally superior National 
Assembly.3 Rivalries between key economic ministries have led 
to overlapping portfolios, making it difficult to determine 
which ministry's rules apply to a particular issue (Euromoney 
September 1993:4). The system is further complicated by the 
complex political and legal interrelationship between central 
and provincial authorities which requires local government to 
3enforce and observe national legislation, and at the same time 
allows it to develop localised legal regimes (Law on the 
3 For example the Law on Private Enterprise 1990 allows a 
maximum of 30 days for the issue of a licence to carry on a business, 
but the government increased this waiting period to 60 days by 
Decree No. 34, 28 January 1992. 
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Organization of People's Committees 1992; Law on the 
Organization of People's Councils 1994) . 
Drafting problems 
Technical problems such as the failure to repeal earlier statutes 
after the enactment of consolidating legislation plague the law­
making system. For example, the only new provisions 
introduced by the recently enacted Labour Code 1994 are the 
right to strike (Arts . 173[2] and [3] - 179) and official 
recognition of tripartite representation drawn from government, 
unions and employee groups (Saigon Giai Phong 28 May 1994: 
1, 3) . The remaining issues were already enshrined in various 
decrees, ordinances and circulars. Admittedly the Labour Code 
1994 (Art. 197) repealed all prior conflicting provisions . 
Because it failed to repeal all consolidated provisions, 
however, conflicting interpretations may arise, particularly 
where different wording is used to describe similar subject 
matter. 
In other circumstances, a statutory instrument may lie 
dormant awaiting the establishment of a body to administer its 
provisions . With considerable French assistance a superb 
Maritime Code was enacted by the National Assembly in June 
1990. Unfortunately, not one of its 244 well-drafted and 
conceptually coherent articles have been enforced. The 
sophisticated institutions required to administer the Code, such 
as the National Registry Book of Seagoing Ships (Maritime 
Code 1990, Arts. 8[3], 14,) and the Vietnam Maritime Shipping 
Inspection Board (Arts. 17, 18,) have not yet been established. 
A critical lack of resources and trained personnel within the 
responsible ministry (Ministry of Transport, Tele­
communications and Post) are favoured explanations for 
legislative inaction. For similar reasons, twelve months after the 
enactment of the Law on Protection of the Environment 1993, 
the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE} 
has not established the State Environment Protection Authority 
(Arts. 13, 37, 39) .  Compounding the delay, the government has 
yet to enact provisions governing the preparation and approval 
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of environmental impact statements (Arts. 18, 55) . Until these 
pivotal implementing regulations are promulgated, the 
environmental impact of foreign and domestic investment 
continues to be assessed on an ad hoe basis by provincial and 
city people's committees, or in the case of large developments 
by the prime minister.4 
On a more fundamental level, the delay between enactment 
of enabling statutes and implementing regulations may be 
traced to uncertainty regarding the likely course of business 
development. Unlike their Western counterparts, who may 
empirically observe business practices before drafting law, 
Vietnamese law makers are faced with the twin problems of an 
ill-defined and rapidly changing commercial culture. It is 
difficult enough in any jurisdiction to respond to current 
commercial needs and anticipate future developments, but the 
task is particularly onerous in Vietnam where law makers often 
have little knowledge of market laws (Sidel 1993:221, 223-228) 
and far less business practice. If this were not enough, economic 
development in Vietnam cannot meaningfully be compared 
with reforms in other countries in the region, with perhaps the 
highly qualified exception of the People's Republic of China 
(Cohen1990:43). 
For these reasons line ministries have been extremely careful 
to avoid the enactment of inappropriate or redundant rules . 
They cautiously evaluate the probable impact legislation may 
have upon business development; inaction is preferred to an 
enduring record of legislative incompetence. Consider for 
example, the long awaited Law on Business Bankruptcy 1993 
which was due to commence operation on 1 July 1994 (Art. 51) .  
Continuing political uncertainty over the future status of state 
4 So-called �group C' projects are assessed by the State Committee 
for Cooperation and Investment and by people's committees. See 
Regulations on Evaluation of Projects with Foreign-owned Capital, 
see Arts. 2, 12, issued with Decision No. 366 HDBT Council of 
Ministers, 7 November 1991;  Law on Promotion of Domestic 
Investment 1994, Art. 13[6] ; Law on Private Enterprises 1990, Art. 8; 
Law on Companies 1990, Art. 14[5] . 
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enterprises has reportedly delayed the issue of implementing 
regulations and the establishment of the administrative bodies 
(Law on Business Bankruptcy 1993, Chapter III), which were to 
have presided over the liquidation of private and state 
business organizations. The Supreme Court and MOJ similarly 
failed to enact technical rules elucidating bankruptcy procedure 
and debt enforcement respectively. Legislative inaction, 
however, can only be a short-term response; social tensions 
requiring state supervision will only increase as the pace of 
economic reform accelerates. 
Recent legislation 
This chapter cannot attempt an exhaustive survey all new 
commercial legislation. During 1994 alone at least 100 statutory 
instruments were enacted, this number would swell to many 
hundreds if provincial and city level subordinate legislation 
were included. Instead, this paper discusses some of the major 
legislative changes in land laws and especially corporate 
regulations, guided by the rubric of statutory versus 
bureaucratic regulation. 
Land law 
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) land management 
policy rejected the colonial notion of inalienable private rights 
in favour of the socialist view that rights should be restricted 
for the public good.5 This general premise continued after the 
establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1975-76 
and still underlies post-doi moi land legislation (Vie tnam 
Investment Review 16 March 1993:18 [Nguyen Van Phu]) .  All 
private occupiers of land borrow their rights from the state 
and, with the exception of agricultural workers, must pay an 
annual land tax as 'rent' (Ordinance on Residential Housing­
Land Tax, Arts. 2, 3, 29 June 1991) .  
5 The Agrarian Law 1952 (DRV) authorized the nationalization 
of land according to the class category of the owner. 
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The Law on Land 1993, which revised the Land Law 1988, 
crystallized the limited private rights cited in the 1992 
Constitution. The 1993 law recognizes rights to land use, 
transfer and inheritance. It pays particular attention to defining 
rights in rural land, without going so far as to allow outright 
ownership of land (Voice of Vietnam [14 July], FBIS-EAS 93-134 
15 July 1993:54) . These developments are important, because 
ownership and transfer rights are fundamental to private sector 
development. They engender confidence, promote investment 
and can assist efficient resource allocation. 
Although not entitled to full ownership, private companies 
and individuals wishing to develop land have available to them 
various lesser interests in land (Law on Land 1993, Art. 26) .  
The highest of these is known as a land use right. Land use 
rights are not created equally, as many of their qualities, such 
as duration or ability to be transferred or bequeathed, depend 
upon the purpose for which the land is to be used. Land 
allotted for domestic housing, for instance, exists for an 
unspecified period of time, perhaps in perpetuity, provided the 
state does not need to recover the land for an official purpose 
(Art. 28) .6 A land tenure certificate issued by a people's 
committee may be freely transferred, bequeathed (Art. 3[3]), or 
mortgaged (Arts . 3[3], 77[2]}, and in most respects behaves 
much like a Western fee simple estate. Consequently land use 
rights allotted for domestic purposes, if not conveying factual 
ownership, at least entitle an occupier to a quite extensive right 
of disposition. In contrast, land allotted for commercial use, 
such as a hotel, is available for a limited duration and cannot 
be transferred without the approval of the appropriate 
provincial or city-level people's committee.7 
6 Land management authorities will not specify the duation 
length of an urban land use right, however. Unless an occupier 
infringes a provision of the law, or the land is acquired under 
compulsory acquisition, there is no legislative impediment to a 
perpetual duration. See Law on Land 1993, Arts. 3, 20, 73, 79. 
7 Law makers generally regard the transfer of land used for 
commercial purposes as a sale of a business. As there is no specific 
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Land use rights are also shaped by the legal status of an 
occupier. With the exception of urban residential and forestry 
land (Decree No. 2-CP), where no legal distinction is made 
between the state, corporations, individuals and households 
(Decree No. 60-CP, Arts. l, 2, 6, 7), all other land rights reflect 
the legal status of the occupier. For example, agricultural land 
(Decree No. 64-CP, Art. 1) can be allotted to individuals or 
households by district level people's committees, whereas an 
allotment made to a private company is strictly limited by the 
specific criteria inserted into its business licence (Circular No. 
472 PMDSKJ MOJ, Art. 2 [vii], 20 May 1993; Law on Land 
1993, Arts . 3[3], 56) . Similar rules apply when companies use 
urban land for non-residential purposes. Disputes concerning 
land use rights are likewise adjudicated according to the legal 
status of the litigants . All those concerning companies or 
organizations, for example, must be resolved by city or 
provincial people's committees (Law on Land, Art. 38) . 
Another dimension to the problem arises from the ongoing 
struggle between the public interest, as it is interpreted by the 
state, and individual rights. Subject to the vagaries of political 
fashion, there is a general consensus in Western countries that 
in a just society the notional boundaries that delineate 
individual rights must at times be respected and only under 
unusual circumstances be breached by the state for the public 
good (Cotterrell 1992:130-133) . In Vietnam, on the other hand, 
superior community interests have traditionally overwhelmed 
individual rights, so that the individual dissolves into the 
community (Tuong Lai 1993 :10, 13-14; Jamieson 1993:39-40) . 
Today, factors such as the demand for land, nature of terrain, 
urban character, social utility and above all the efficient use of 
land are evaluated by people's committees during the allotment 
process (Law on Land 1993, Arts. 8, 20) . Put another way, 
private land rights exist at the discretion of bureaucrats, who 
legislation on this point, regulatory authorities base their 
interpretation upon an inference drawn from Law on Private 
Enterprise 1990, Art. 15, and Law on Companies 1990, Art. 21, that 
transfer is not allowed without people's committee approval. 
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look beyond individual needs to broader community ones. For 
example, an allocation of land to a household may be resumed 
by the state not only when tenure expires or the land has been 
abandoned, but when land is used for a purpose other than 
that for which it was allotted or exceeds the amount stipulated 
for each household (Decree No. 64-CP, Art. 13), or when duties 
contained in a land tenure certificate are not followed (Law on 
Land 1993, Art. 26) .8 
This latter provision in particular goes well beyond the 
powers usually vested in Western land management officials. 
Corporate regulation 
A distinguishing feature of Vietnam's commercial legal system 
is a heavy reliance on administrative licensing, in preference to 
rights-based laws to control business formation and practices. 
Such administrative measures fill the many gaps left by 
legislation. As previously discussed, the allotment and transfer 
of rural and commercial land must be approved by 
bureaucrats . Administrative control is most complex when it 
regulates company (private enterprise) incorporation and 
business licensing. Some idea of the cost and difficulties of the 
incorporation process may be gauged from the formation of 
Song Thu Ltd, a company established in Ho Chi Minh City to 
operate a mini hotel . The incorporation process took eight 
months. During this time the company promoters submitted 40 
documents requiring 83 official seals and 107 signatures to 26 
different official bodies. Although the Laws on Companies 
1990 and Private Enterprises 1990 became operational in 1991, 
recent implementing circulars that changed the incorporation 
process makes the incorporation process a topical area of law 
reform. The present process may be summarized as follows. 
8 For maximum residential areas Law on Land 1993, Art. 54, (rural 
residential); specific regulations governing urban residential use 
have not yet been issued. 
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Incorporation. An application to establish a privately owned 
company must first be lodged with the district people's 
committee where the promoters are domiciled (Law on 
Companies 1990, Art. 2) or private enterprise (Law, on Private 
Enterprise 1990, Art. 2) . It should be accompanied by a 
curriculum vitae certified by the district police verifying that the 
applicant is entitled to reside in that locality and is not subject 
to current criminal charges or an undischarged sentence 
(Circular No. 472 PMDSKJ, MOJ, Art. l [ii] ), 20 May 1993) . 
Once this initial hurdle is overcome, the application together 
with supporting documentation must be forwarded to the local 
city or provincial people's committee (assessment department) . 
Required information includes names, ages and permanent 
address of the founding members (Law on Companies 1990, 
Art. 14[1 ]), the name and address of the proposed head office 
(Art. 14[2] ), objectives, branches and areas of business of the 
company (Art. 14[3] ) , chartered capital and method of 
contributing capital (Art. 14[4 ] ), environmental impact 
statement (Art. 14[5]) ,  feasibility plan (Art. 14[6]), medical 
certificate (Circular No. 472, Art. 5, 29 /9 /93, MOJ) and 
educational qualifications (Circular No. 472, Art. 6, 29 /9 /93, 
MOJ) . 
The wide discretion exercised by assessment departments 
during the approval process is increasingly being guided by 
prescriptive rules issued by line-ministries (222 HDBT, Art. l, 
23 July 1991) .  In key sectors of the economy, tourism for 
example (Decree No. 09 /CP 5 February 1994; Circular No. 
715 /TCD2, 9 July 1994), prescriptive rules have been 
promulgated to govern aspects of the management and 
minimum capital requirements for companies. The discretion to 
increase capital requirements remains with the assessment 
department; this mechanism is widely used to discourage 
investment in activities that fall outside of the broad policy 
directives issued by the party (Resolution of the Seventh 
Session of the CPV 1994) and government. 
Although there are many grounds for rejecting applications 
the preferred modus operandi of assessment departments is to 
apply indirect pressure to modify, delay or withdraw 
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disfavoured proposals. If an applicant is unresponsive, the 
responsible people's committee may delay an application; 
charge excessively for relocation, compensation and 
infrastructure improvement; or impose highly restrictive 
environmental controls. However, it is important to realize that 
businesses wishing to invest in priority areas of the economy 
are most unlikely to encounter major difficulties and may, on 
the contrary, receive financial assistance from people's 
committees. 
Certification. Every document submitted to an assessment 
department must first be certified by a designated authority 
(Circular No. 472 PMDSKJ, Art. l [iii]-2 [vii] ,  20 May 1993) . 
This process is particularly rigorous in the case of capital 
contributions. In addition to stipulating minimum capital 
requirements, an assessment department may also determine 
the ratio of fixed to liquid assets. In contrast to the favourable 
conditions enjoyed by foreign investors, who may borrow an 
approved proportion of their invested capital subject to 
approval by the State Committee for Cooperation and 
Investment (SCCI) (Decree No. 18 CP, Art. 27), domestic 
investors cannot contribute capital in the form of borrowings. 
Only bank accounts or state bonds may be used to contribute 
the liquid asset component of working capital. A certificate 
verifying ownership of liquid assets must be issued by the 
appropriate bank or bond issuing agency. Certification of fixed 
capital is more complicated, since it requires an evaluation 
certificate issued by the finance department of the district 
people's committee where the asset is located . The valuation 
also must be certified by a notary public (Circular No. 472, Art. 
2 [v],  PMDSKJ) . Certification is also required for health, 
education, criminal and residency reports . Fees charged for 
these services vary significantly among provinces. 
The company register. Once a business licence has been 
issued by a people's committee, promoters are required to 
register the company with a planning department which is 
supervised by the State Planning Committee but is attached to 
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people's committees (Law Amending a Number of Articles of 
the Law on Companies, Art. l [i], National Assembly, 22 June 
1994; Law Amending a Number of Articles of the Law on 
Private Business, 1994). Registration used to be performed by 
state economic arbitrators (Law on Companies 1990, Art. 17), 
until they were disbanded on 1 July 1994. All the staff directly 
involved in registration were transferred to the State Planning 
Committee, the remainder went to the Supreme Court (Decree 
No. 355/TTg, Prime Minister, 1 1 July 1994) .  
In the past, provided documents conformed to official 
requirements state economic arbitrators treated the registration 
process as a purely mechanical procedure and registration was 
rarely refused. More recently, planning departments have begun 
to re-examine the merits of an application, looking beyond the 
four corners of certified documentation . This practice most 
commonly occurs where capital is to be invested in a low 
priority economic sector (e.g. hotel development). 
The reasons for transferring registration to the State 
Planning Committee in preference to the MOJ remain unclear. 
The decision is particularly surprising as the MOJ already had 
considerable corporate expertise, having drafted the Law on 
Companies and most subsequent subordinate legislation in this 
area. Moreover it already controls an administrative network of 
justice departments in every province, whereas not every 
provincial government has a planning department. In addition 
to these structural advantages, same degree of procedural 
neutrality may have been expected from the MOJ. Since it is not 
primarily concerned with economic planning, it may have 
refrained from revisiting policy decisions already taken at the 
local government level. Possibly economic neutrality may have 
been a political disadvantage in this case; the State Planning 
Committee possibly was given control over company 
registration so that it could strengthen central policy 
implementation at the local level (Do Muoi 1994c:67-68).9 
9 This policy objective would bring Vietnam into line with the 
Chinese company registration system, presided over by the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (Epstein 1994:26-28) .  
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National regis tration . As Vietnam is a unitary state, 
companies registered in one province are recognized nationally 
as juridical entities and may trade in every province. However, 
where a company wishes to open a branch or representative 
office in another province, it is required to lodge a new 
registration application (Law on Companies 1990, Art. 20; 
Circular No. 472 PMDSKJ, MOJ, 20 May 1993) . This must 
include a certified copy of the company registration and an 
application setting out details of the proposed business and 
raw material, labour and utility requirements. If a supervising 
people's committee decides that local infrastructure cannot 
support the proposed endeavour, an application may be 
deferred or refused . Documents evincing ownership or a 
leasehold over a suitable premises are also required (Le Hong 
Heng 1992:25, 26). These regulations highlight fragmentation 
within Vietnam's legal system. Where local governments pursue 
different development strategies, a company registered in one 
province may be precluded from establishing a branch office in 
a neighbouring locality. Such localism hampers the central 
government's attempts to coordinate (Saigon Giai Phong 19 
March 1994:2) . 
Production regis tration . Once a company has received a 
business permit from the vice chairman of a people's committee 
and a company registration certificate from a planning 
committee, it may commence business. Where this involves 
manufacturing, all products must be registered with the General 
Department of Standards, Weights, Measurement and Quality 
(Ordinance on the Quality of Goods, Art. 7, 1 July 1991) before 
they can be distributed on the domestic and international 
markets . The Science, Technology and Environment 
Departments (Ordinance on the Quality of Goods, Arts. 4, 7, 1, 
July 1991) attached to each provincial/ city people's committee 
have been delegated the authority to determine whether 
products comply with national standards (e.g. Decree No. 382-
QD; Decree No. 130-QD; Decree No. 47-QD). 
As few national standards have been promulgated, 
applicants are often required to submit their own standards. 
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These are usually based on guidelines supplied by the 
manufacturers of plant and equipment used during the 
production process. In addition to attracting civil (Ordinance 
on the Quality of Goods, Art. 34, COM, 1 Jul 1992) and 
criminal penalties (Penal Code 1986, Arts. 116-168), the sale of 
unregistered goods or those that do not conform to stipulated 
quality and technical standards constitutes a breach of an 
economic contract (Ordinance on Economic Contracts 1989, 
Art. 13) . 
Incorporation fees . The preceding discussion reveals a 
regulatory system that is preoccupied with the meticulous 
details of company membership, capital contributions, business 
activities and product standards. Complex licensing provisions 
impose costs on applicants and raise monies for the 
bureaucracy. A licensing system originally intended to control 
private capital has become a means of generating revenue as 
numerous arms of the bureaucracy charge fees to exercise their 
discretion to grant approvals or certify documents. The 40 
documents, 83 seals and one hundred and seven signatures 
required to incorporate Song Thu Ltd are indicative of the 
number of agencies that may profit from the licensing system. 
In some instances, such as a company registration fees, the 
amount is prescribed by legislation is generally in line with the 
expenses prevailing throughout Vietnam. Documents certified 
by notary publics such as hospital health records and 
educational qualifications are also assessed at predetermined 
rates (Circular No. 84 TT /CB; Decree No. 45 HDBT) . The 
amount for other fees is determined at the local level on an ad 
hoe basis, subject to a general administrative authority to levy 
imposts. Police at the district level, for example, have a general 
discretion to charge fees for services rendered. Not surprisingly 
fee structures vary considerably among localities. In the case of 
asset valuation this may amount to tens of millions of dong. 
When the costs of drafting and lodging documentation, and 
negotiating administrative fees are added to official imposts, 
the total cost of incorporating a company may range between 
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seven to thirty million dong, an enormous expense by 
Vietnamese standards. 
The uncoordinated imposition of fees concerns the central 
government. In the recently promulgated Resolution No. 38 CP 
on Administrative Reform (4 May 1994), Article 2 stipulates 
that ministries, heads of ministerial-level organs, heads of 
government organs, and the chairmen of provincial and city 
people's committees directly under the central authority must 
initiate a drive to scrutinize all stipulations now in force 
governing administrative procedures and fees in areas under 
their responsibility, including those stipulations promulgated 
by lower echelon officials. This is to restrict unauthorized 
administrative stipulations and procedures and to supplement 
and revise those procedures no longer compatible with 
commercial practices, which are disrupting the activities of 
state institutions inconveniencing the public. 
Regulating economic contracts. The discussion so far suggests 
that once a company has been formed, it may expand its 
business objectives and in the process create a contractual 
bubble of commercial freedom (Law on Companies 1990, Art 
12). It is true that compared to Western contractual regimes, 
economic contracts in Vietnam are remarkably unencumbered 
by statutory controls (Ordinance on Economic Contracts 1989, 
Art. 1 ) . 10 But it is equally true that the state uses bodies such 
as the Market Control Board and Tax Department to police 
business standards and objectives and their administrative 
interpretation of standards in some ways approximates the 
functions of normative rules in the West. 1 1  
Only registered businesses may enter a legally binding 
economic contract (Ordinance on Economic Contracts 1989, 
Arts . 2, 8) . In theory at least, unregistered traders are not 
permitted to form contracts over income-producing property 
10 Contracts concerning commercial matters are defined by statute 
as economic contracts. 
1 1  For an account of classical legal though see Kennedy 1980:3; c.f. 
the legal realists, e.g. (Cohen 1935:809) . 
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with each other and can only enter into legally enforceable 
economic contracts with registered entities (Decree No. 11 TT­
PL, Art. 1 ) .  Special provision is made for scientists, 
technicians, artists, owners of household business, private 
farmers and fishermen to enter economic contracts (Ordinance 
on Economic Contracts 1989, Art. 42) but according to Art. 8 
(Ordinance on Economic Contracts 1989), contracts will be 
invalid unless they are registered. Yet to be decided is whether 
individual traders or family units may enter economic 
contracts . On the one hand, Ordinance on Civil Contracts 
1991 ,  Art. 57[ 1 ] ,  states that even if the purpose of an 
agreement is commercial, it will be deemed a civil contract 
when individual traders or family units are the contracting 
parties. On the other hand, the Decree on Signing and Carrying 
Out of Economic Contracts 1992, Art. 2, states that where the 
transaction is for business purposes, registered individuals or 
family units may enter economic contracts . Those who 
deliberately enter an economic contract in contravention of 
these rules may be liable for administrative penalties or 
criminal prosecution (Ordinance on Economic Contracts 1989, 
Art. 39[3]; Penal Code 1986, Art. 168) . 12 In reality scant regard 
is given to official sanctions and commercial activity continues 
to flourish in the household economy (Hoang Kim Giao 
1992 :10-14) even though it is still a criminal offence to trade 
without a permit (Penal Code 1986, Art. 168). In contrast, all 
may enter civil contracts, which often involve income producing 
activities (Ordinance on Civil Contracts 1991, Art. 3). 
Once a company enters an economic contract, remarkably 
few external normative rules govern business behaviour. 
Legislation is overwhelmingly devoted to regulating the 
mechanics of contractual formation (Ordinance on Economic 
Contracts 1989, Chapter II, Decree No. 17 HDBT, Art. 7), 
penal ties for non-performance (Ordinance on Economic 
Contracts 1989, Chapter III and IV), and the jurisdiction and 
procedures governing dispute resolution (e.g. Decree No. 70-
12 Non-custodial reform two years or less, or imprisonment three 
months to two years. 
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HDBT; Directive No. 40-TT-PC; Circular No. 67-TT-PL; 
Circular No. 67-TT-PL; Circular No. 125-TT-PC; Regulation 
No. 293-TT-PC) .  As previously noted, in the rare instances 
where goods are covered by a National Product Standard, 
quality is regulated administratively by the Department of 
Standards, Weights, Measurement and Quality (Ordinance on 
Economic Contracts 1989, Art. 13; Law on Companies 1990, 
Art. 13(3]) .  In all other circumstances, contractual standards, 
including expressed or implied warranties of fitness for 
purpose, are absolutely binding. In other words contracts may 
be used to create their own legal universe (Decree No. 17  
HDBT, Art. 14), virtually free of  external normative rules that 
in Western countries would govern matters such as contractual 
fairness, equality of bargaining, extra contractual 
representations, abuse of market dominance, and retail price 
maintenance. These aspects of commercial behaviour will not 
be regulated by normative rules until the Civil Code (currently 
in drafting) (Civil Code Drafting Committee 1994:3) and 
Commercial Code are enacted to fill the gaps left by the 
existing patchwork of laws and subordinate rules. According to 
the head of the Drafting Committee for the Commercial Code, 
Professor Luu Van Dat, only a remote possibility exists that 
the code will be introduced within the next five years. In the 
meantime administrative control over economic contracts is 
made possible by the previously described network of licences. 
Domes tic inves tmen t. Responding to complaints from 
domestic business and encouragement from the United Nations 
Development Program, the National Assembly enacted on 22 
June 1994 the Law on Promotion of Domestic Investment. 1 3 
This law is designed to create a regulatory framework that will 
operate in conjunction with business licences to promote 
efficient uses of capital, labour, natural and other resources by 
mobilizing domestic investment. Domestic as opposed to 
foreign investment must be contributed by Vietnamese citizens, 
l3 The law will come into effect on 1 January 1995 and will 
supersede all prior inconsistent legislation. 
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overseas Vietnamese, long-term foreign residents and 
Vietnamese organizations, including private companies (Law 
on Promotion of Domestic Investment 1994, Art. 2) .  In 
accordance with the Constitution, domestic investment and 
profits are protected and guaranteed by the state (Art. 5) . 
There can be no compulsory acquisition without compensation 
(Art. 6). 
Unlike licences that can modify or prohibit investment, the 
law actively encourages it direct assistance that may take the 
form of land allotment, infrastructure, loans, equity investment, 
investment credits and training (Art. 7) . In addition the law 
sets out a regime of tax incentives as follows: 
• 50 per cent reduction of business income tax for one to 
two years, this is extended for one to five years for 
business income tax and one to two years for turnover 
tax for business located in remote areas; 
• profits derived from reinvestment will be exempt from 
business tax; 
• import duties may be waived to encourage selected 
investments; 
• profits earned on shares purchased in privatised state 
enterprises are tax exempt for three years (Art. 10) .  
Without knowing the implementing regulations, detailed 
analysis is premature. Only general observations are possible. It 
is unclear, for example, why the incentives set out in the 
Domestic Investment Promotion Law 1994 differ from those 
contained in the foreign investment regime (Law on Foreign 
Investment 1987 and Decree No. 18, 1993) . It is difficult to 
determine whether foreign or domestic investment is favoured 
by the investment regime because the licensing authorities have 
considerable latitude to adjust tax rates and other concessions. 
As the terms of investment licences are confidential, no records 
can be consulted to allow foreign investors to confirm whether 
the Law on Promotion of Domestic Investment 1994 has been 
used to tilt the 'playing field' in favour of local capital . 
Advantages and disadvantages apply to each regulatory 
regime. Foreign investors pay a lower profit tax (Decree No. 18, 
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Art 67) but much higher utility charges for land rent, electricity, 
telephone and water. Domestic investors in theory pay a higher 
business profit tax (Law on Business Profit Tax 1990, Art. 10) 
but are entitled to longer tax holidays. In reality studies 
demonstrate that domestic investors only rarely pay the full 
rate of taxation (Vietnam News 21 February 1994:4 [Le Dang 
Doanh and Nguyen Xuan Nguyen] .  They are further 
advantaged by the idiosyncratic tax collective system. 
Dispute resolution and endorsement 
Courts 
If a normative legal system is to co-exist with the licensing 
system, it requires a mechanism to enforce private commercial 
rights horizontally against each other. Western legal thought 
suggests that legal rights are not manifested until pitted in 
conflict against another right. 14 Vietnamese traders, however, 
have treated rights as passports to pursue an activity that the 
state might otherwise have prohibited, rather than weapons to 
be enforced against others. These neo-Confucian norms are 
rapidly changing under the proliferation of inter-provincial 
trading links and rapidly expanding foreign investment and 
trade (Ngo Ba Thanh 1994:29-30). 
For these reasons considerable effort is currently devoted to 
reforming commercial dispute resolution structures . The 
institution of state economic arbitration, originally established 
in 1963 to manage production contracts under the centrally 
planned command system (Pham Thanh Vinh 1965 :89-99), 
was abolished on 1 July 1994. Jurisdiction over economic 
disputes, as opposed to civil ones (Ordinance on the Procedure 
14 This narrow interpretation is predicated upon the notion that 
rights must be exercised to exist. This view is only satisfactory in 
the narrow confines of commercial law and becomes quite untenable 
when applied to what are commonly termed human rights. 
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for the Resolution of Civil Cases 1989, Art. 10 [1 ] )15 is  now 
vested in the economic division of the people's court (Law 
amending the Ordinance on the Organization of the Supreme 
People's Court, 1994, Arts. 3-7) . Economic disputes include 
those arising from economic contracts between a company and 
its members (owners) and among the members themselves, the 
purchase and sale of shares and bonds and other matters to be 
prescribed by subordinate legislation. Apart from overcoming 
some minor technical problems with its procedural rules 
( Vietnam Economic Times 30 September 1994:30-31 [Sly and 
Deacons]), this new division of the people's court should be 
able to support the emergence of private commerce by enforcing 
horizontal contractual rights between individuals. 
There is a gap, however, between legislative expectations 
and reality. Most judicial staff of the economic court were 
originally economic arbitrators (Decision No. 355 /TTg) . These 
cadres lack knowledge of market law and court procedure 
(Sidel 1993:223-228, 253-254), and they are generally thought 
to be predisposed in favour of the state sector. Their close 
relationship with administrative authorities arises from shared 
party connections and patronage links formed during their 
period as virtual employees of provincial/ city and district level 
people's committees . 1 6  Control over inferior level people's 
courts has now passed to the MOJ, but it remains to be seen 
whether loyalty to the central level can be so easily transferred. 
These structural problems can and undoubtedly will in time 
be resolved, particularly with the current level of foreign 
assistance. But this is only part of the problem. Separation of 
powers was never part of Vietnam's legal tradition during the 
pre-colonial period (Nguyen Ngoc Huy and Ta Van Tai 1987; 
Hooker 1986: 461-476) . And after independence from France, 
15 Civil disputes are resolved by the civil division of a people's 
court. 
l6 Although they were at all times under the direction of the 
central level State Economic Arbitration Board, inferior level 
arbitrators were recruited, housed and paid by the people's  
committee at  the corresponding level. 
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to  the extent that they functioned at  all, courts and the 
procuracy became subordinate members of a politicized legal 
system which was dominated by the party's security 
apparatus (Ginsburgs 1979: 195-198) . Not surprisingly, courts 
still tend to be regarded as an instrument for implementing 
state policy, rather than a genuinely independent bulwark 
against state action or a protector of private commercial rights. 
Enforcing judgments 
Institutional reform alone is unlikely to improve the quality of 
judicial decisions. Judges of the newly created economic 
division of the people's court (Law amending the Law on the 
Organization of the Supreme People's Court 1994, Art. 1 )  
undoubtedly require intensive retraining in market laws, but an 
abstract knowledge of law needs to be supported by practical 
administrative guidelines or key case summaries compiled in 
the annual report of the Supreme People's Court.17 However, 
success in court will remain a pyrrhic victory until regulations 
are enacted to implement the Law on Business Bankruptcy 
1993 and Ordinance on the Execution of Judgements in Civil 
Cases 1993. In the interim, the law continues to lack sufficient 
'teeth' to make the exercise of a commercial right attractive to 
its holder. 
The Ordinance on Economic Arbitration 1994 (Decree No. 
1 1 6 / CP) was recently enacted to provide a voluntary 
mechanism for the resolution of private commercial disputes. 
Provided they receive approval from the local provincial or city 
people's committee (Art. 7 [2 ] ) , it authorises trade 
organizations to establish their own arbitration centres. Each 
centre requires at least five arbitrators, who in turn must be 
registered with the Council for Selection of Arbitrators, a body 
established under the auspices of the MOJ (Art. 8) . Like most 
other aspects of commercial activity these centres will be tightly 
17 It should be noted that the Supreme People's Court already 
published a key case summary in its annual report but these rulings 
are only persuasive on inferior courts Gones 1994:98-104). 
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regulated by the state . Nonetheless there is  still scope for 
private investors to create their own predicable, politically 
independent and impartial dispute resolution fora. Ultimately, 
however, if a party fails to comply with an arbitral award the 
entire action must be reheard in an economic court (Art. 31) .  
Administrative review 
As the preceding discussion reveals, virtually every aspect of 
private business activity is governed by an administrative 
discretion. Tight controls allow local administrators to exclude 
those who are undercapitalized or lack professional 
qualifications. They may also enable bureaucrats to favour 
those who enjoy patronage relationships and disadvantage 
others . In this regulatory environment the need for a system of 
judicial review of administrative action is manifest .  
Administrative reform has been given a high priority by the 
state (Resolution No. 38 CP), though its focus has been almost 
entirely structural (Nguyen Nien 1994:25) .  Faults in the 
system, so it is argued, may be rectified by streamlining licence 
approvals, improving, training and structural reorganization 
(Huy Due 1994:66-67; Saigon Giai Phong 12 March 1994:2 [Le 
Hu u N ghia] ) .  Little progress has been made to extend to 
administrative regulation the underlying principle of legal 
reform that a law based society should bring greater regularity 
to political, economic and social life . If legal guidelines are to 
constrain the bureaucracy, a system of review should make 
officials accountable not only to their superiors, but also to 
those affected by their decisions. 
A law governing administrative review is currently under 
consideration. But drafts suggest modest reforms that will not 
emphasize procedural protections for those adversely affected 
by administrative decision making. Most political actors regard 
diminution of administrative authority as a potential threat to 
political authority. Nevertheless, certain influential reformers 
continue to vigorously champion bureaucratic accountability. 
Current drafts of the Law on the Organization of the 
Administrative Courts envisage a highly conditional form of 
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review. This court must, for example, consider the nebulous 
'will of the state' before individual rights. Judicial independence 
is further undermined by an obligation shared with the 
Fatherland Front and authorized mass movements, to 'struggle, 
prevent and fight against unlawful violations in state 
administrative activities' .18 
It would be naive to assume that the creation of a judicial 
forum capable of reviewing the legality of administrative 
decisions, acts, omissions and delays will on its own bring 
accountability to bureaucratic decision making. The review of 
bureaucratic discretion will only be effective when the licensing 
process is framed by judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards. Without written guidelines that describe the criteria 
to be applied in the exercise of a discretion, courts will be 
unable to determine whether a refusal to grant a business 
licence falls within the limits of administrative authority and 
was properly made. For example, if a licence is denied because 
the market for the proposed products was deemed to be 
insufficient, the criteria used to reach this conclusion should be 
public documents. Unless it is framed within a knowable range 
of limitations the exercise of a discretion is tantamount to the 
formation of government policy and as such is beyond judicial 
review. The challenge facing law makers is to establish a system 
of review that is sufficiently authoritative to check abuses 
within the licensing system, but at the same time does not 
offend political autonomy. 
Forecasting future trends 
In spite of its cost and complexity it is entirely possible that the 
extensive use of licences will remain an enduring feature of 
Vietnam's legal system. Law makers acknowledge that most of 
Vietnam's economically successful East Asian neighbours use 
l8 It is interesting to compare the Administrative Litigation Law of 
the People's Republic of China (Chinese Law and Practice 5, 5 June 
1989:37), which introduced a modest right allowing citizens and 
juridicial persons to appeal administrative decisions to the courts. 
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administrative guidance to tilt their legal systems in favour of 
state-sponsored economic and social goals, at the expense of 
rights-based law. Notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary and 
a considerable improvement in legislative drafting, little has 
been done in real terms to diminish administrative control over 
business activity. Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet's plea for 'a 
complete change from bureaucratic management to running the 
nation by law' remains unfulfilled (Vietnam Investment Review 3 
August 1993:4) . 
It is widely believed that, even with substantial structural 
changes, rights-based laws should not become the primary 
means of controlling economic activity. There is a new 
willingness to find sources of law in local commercial practice 
and cultural values. This so-called 'National Characteristics 
Model' is expected to graft the existing licensing system onto 
the rights-based legal model. How this will be achieved in 
practice is a matter for speculation, but in theory local 
authorities will have greater autonomy to administer business 
development, relatively free from objective rules of law. There 
is some evidence of a policy shift in this direction, although 
formal acceptance of this model remains uncertain. 
Licensing is not of course unique to Vietnam. Western 
industrial countries progressively abandoned comprehensive 
licensing in favour of a rights-based legal system during the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Steindorft 1979:8) . A 
theoretical realignment towards laissez faire capitalism and 
practical concerns about the cost, complexity and corruption 
that plague licensing systems propelled the shift to normative 
rules . Although Vietnam's leaders remain unimpressed with 
unrestrained capitalism, these pragmatic considerations 
resonant strongly in Vietnam's commercial legal system. 
The administration and enforcement of licenses imposes a 
heavy cost burden on the bureaucracy. Faced with a rapidly 
increasing number of private investors and a tangled web of 
interconnecting and overlapping licenses and licensing 
authorities, policing agencies admit that they cannot 
adequately enforce the law. Inadequate resources and training 
are only partly to blame. Licensing only creates vertical lines of 
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control between the state and private entities. Under this top­
down system virtually the entire responsibility for policing 
business practices and product standards rests with the state. 
Until the recent creation of the economic division of the 
People's Court, the state had done little to encourage private 
enforcement of horizontal contractual rights. When they become 
operational, the Law on Business Bankruptcy 1993 and the 
Ordinance on the Execution of Judgments in Civil Cases 1993 
will strengthen the court structure. In the meantime, the law 
continues to lack sufficient ' teeth' to make contractual 
enforcement commercially attractive. 
Problems of cost and complexity, although substantial, can 
in time be remedied by structural reform. Corruption, on the 
other hand, is inextricably bound up with the licensing system, 
where each new administrative responsibility creates another 
opportunity for profit. The situation is sufficiently serious for 
the ruling elite to regard bureaucratic corruption as a threat to 
the authority of the party and government. In short, an 
unaccountable discretion creates a double edged sword . 
Although its flexibility may assist business regulation, it may 
also be the source of corruption. There is some hope that the 
forthcoming Law on State Enterprises will reduce the conflict of 
interest between administrative and commercial functions by 
severing the financial link between state enterprises and the 
bureaucracy. 
Vietnam's legal system cannot be shaped by internal factors 
alone. Burgeoning international trading links, the forthcoming 
integration into ASEAN and membership of GATT (WTO) will 
increasingly require Vietnam to harmonize its domestic legal 
system with those of its trading partners (Ngo Ba Thanh 1994: 
26, 29-31 ) .  Of course a balance exists between national self 
determination and international expectations, but the 
devolution of further unaccountable authority to local 
government can only make an already opaque system harder to 
understand by foreign and domestic private investors. 
This chapter started by asking the question: should 
commercial regulation depend upon the objective authority of 
the bureaucracy or upon compliance with statutory rules? 
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Although these two methods of legal centres are set up in 
opposition to each other, the discussion reveals that they co­
exist in Vietnam; neither system functions more effectively the 
other. Broad normative laws tend to unify commercial practice 
by establishing general comprehensive national standards, but 
are not particularly effective in a country unfamiliar with both 
the mechanism of social control through normative law and the 
values embedded in legislative instruments (ibid. :26-29) . This 
supposition helps to explain the high rate of non-compliance 
with legislative rules in Vietnam. It also suggests that reform of 
the legal system should look beyond law-based rules towards 
mechanisms that inculcate moral values embedded in state 
policy. In fact the state is actively promoting the use of 
ideological apparatus such as the Fatherland Front to augment 
instrumental lines of control. 
Licenses already provide an alternative to rights based 
legislation. They are capable of flexibly responding to constant 
shifts in state policy and local business practices. But they also 
often lead to excessive regulation, corruption and localism. 
These problems can to some extent be reduced by 
comprehensive normative laws, particularly ones that are 
vigorously enforced by the courts. Certainty is unlikely to enter 
the legal system until economic policies are stabilized and an 
independent system of administrative review becomes 
operational. 
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Major Legislation 
1992 
Constitution 
Appendix 
Law on the Organization of the National Assembly 
Law on Election of Members of the National Assembly 
Ordinance on Housing and Land Tax 
Law on the Organization of the Government 
Law on the Organization of the People's Courts 
Law on the Organization of the People's Procuracy 
1993 
Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code 
Law on Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code 
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Diplomat Representations, International 
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Vietnam 
Ordinance on Civil Verdict Enforcement 
Ordinance on the Recognition and Enforcement in 
Vietnam of Civil Verdicts and Decisions Announced 
by Foreign Courts 
Ordinance on People's Courts' Judges and Assessors 
Ordinance on People's Procuracy's Procurators 
Law on Tax on Agricultural Land 
Law on Publishing 
Land Law 
Gas and Oil Law (Petroleum) 
Law on Turnover Tax 
Law on Special Sales Tax 
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Law on Projects Tax 
Ordinance on Medical and Pharmaceutical Private 
Practising 
Ordinance on the Vietnamese Representative Offices 
in Foreign Countries 
Ordinance on Marriages and Families between 
Vietnamese Nationals and Foreigners 
Law on Amendments to the Law on Organization of 
the People's Courts 
Environment Protection Law 
Ordinance on the Enforcement of Civil Judgements 
1994 
Labour Code 
Law on Organization of the People's Council and People's 
Committee 
Law on Election of the Delegates of the People's Council 
Law on Promotion of Domestic Investment 
Law on Taxes on Transfer of Land Use Rights 
Law on Army Service 
Law on the Encouragement of Domestic Investment 
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Law Amending a Number of  Articles of  the Company Law 
Law Amending a Number of Articles of the Private Enterprise 
Law 
Ordinance on Procedure of Resolution of Economic Disputes 
Ordinance on Income Taxes for People Who Have High Incomes 
Ordinance on Real Estate Taxes 
Ordinance on Rights and Obligations of the Domestic Individuals 
Who Use Land in Vietnam 
Ordinance on Taxes for Agricultural Land Users Who Use the Land 
Excess Prescribed Area 
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